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vLate one Thursday afternoon in March, a massive power outage darkened much
of the University of California’s Berkeley campus. Classes ended abruptly, stu-
dents were herded out of darkened dormitories, and the campus server went down.
But the lights did not stay off everywhere on campus. Tucked away in basements
and behind buildings was a secret weapon, 40 backup generators or BUGs, 29 of
them diesel-fired. During the blackout all but one were switched on to protect
sensitive laboratory experiments, power dining facilities, and light hallways. Their
service came at a steep cost, however. Toxic diesel exhaust from the Berkeley
BUGs wafted across the busy campus and into nearby residential and commercial
areas. Alarmed to see plumes of smoke from exhaust outlets, several staff and stu-
dents dialed 911.
Although there wasn’t a fire, there was still plenty to worry about. BUGs are
large diesel engines, similar to those found in Greyhound buses, eighteen-wheel
trucks, or locomotives. Because they are intended to operate only in the rare event
of a power failure, they lack even rudimentary pollution controls. BUGs expose
people living, working, and going to school nearby to high levels of toxic diesel
emissions. Diesel BUGs emit smog-forming chemicals, fine particles and cancer-
causing compounds at many times the rate of newer diesel engines with pollution
controls. At their worst, BUGs pollute up to 100 times as much as conventional
power plants. This report analyzes the health impacts of BUGs and provides rec-
ommendations on how these impacts can be lessened.
BUGS and California’s recent electricity supply shortages
The California Air Resources Board (ARB) estimates there are more than 11,000
diesel BUGs in the state. Regulators’ records indicate that BUG use increased
substantially from December 2000 to May 2001, when rolling blackouts occurred.
Faced with the threat of recurring outages, the administration of Governor
Gray Davis developed a plan to use California’s largest diesel BUGs as blackout
“busters,” a function for which they were never approved. Under the plan, BUG
owners would have received cash payments to operate BUGs when power sup-
plies got tight. Legislation was even proposed to roll back restrictions on BUG
use and provide taxpayer-financed cash incentives for companies to purchase
BUGs. Fortunately Californians were spared the predicted nightmare scenario of
frequent summer blackouts, and these plans were never implemented. But some
experts predict California could face more shortages. If they’re right, BUGs could
once again emerge as an under-regulated, highly polluting antidote.
BUGS remain a serious health threat
Even if the shortages do not materialize, California’s newly expanded crop of
BUGs still poses a significant public health threat that merits greater oversight.
Five influential governmental or scientific bodies have designated diesel exhaust
as a probable or potential human carcinogen. Recent studies have found that diesel
exhaust contributes more than 70% of the cancer risk from air toxics in the United
Executive summary
vi
States.1 The cancer risk from diesel exhaust is about ten times higher than all
other toxic air pollutants combined.2
Diesel exhaust also has numerous acute and chronic noncancer effects, involv-
ing the respiratory, neurological and immunological systems.3 Diesel exhaust con-
tains or creates nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs),
both precursors to ground-level ozone, or smog; carbon monoxide (CO); and par-
ticulate matter (PM).
Especially worrisome is the fact that diesel BUGs emit fine particles at extremely
high rates. Studies have linked fine particles to many adverse health effects, includ-
ing asthma, cardiovascular and respiratory problems, strokes, and heart attacks.4
Researchers estimate that as many as 60,000 Americans die prematurely each year
because of exposure to fine particles.5 Children, the elderly, and the ill (especially
those who have existing respiratory problems) are particularly vulnerable.
California is swarming with BUGs
There are likely many more BUGs in California today than the 11,000 estimated
by the Air Resources Board before the electricity shortages. Regulators can only
make informed guesses about the num-
ber of BUGs, because until recently
some air districts did not even require
BUG owners to get a permit. Regula-
tors not only had no way of knowing
who had a BUG, they could not con-
duct inspections to detect and penalize
unauthorized use.
Air quality regulators need to know
where the BUGs are, especially as BUG
owners everywhere face growing incentives for unauthorized use. Foremost among
these incentives are demand-response programs, which compensate customers
across the nation for cutting their use of grid power when electricity supplies are
tight. While these programs can save consumers money and reduce the threat of
power outages, they also tempt BUG owners to reap incentive payments by sub-
stituting dirty BUG power for much cleaner grid power. The complex utility rates
for large commercial and industrial cus-
tomers can create additional financial
incentives for unauthorized BUG use.
Using data from the California
Energy Commission (CEC) inventory of
nearly 4,000 large BUGs, Environmen-
tal Defense found that most California
BUGs are clustered near where people
live, work, and go to school, as illustrated
in Figure 3-2, page 10. Even within heav-
ily urbanized regions BUGs are likely to
be found where populations are most
dense, as is the case in Los Angeles (see Figure 3-3, page 10). That means the
potential health damage caused by BUGs is compounded.
Figure 3-2. See page 10 for full-color version.
Figure 3-3. See page 10 for full-color version.
vii
The CEC BUG database, compiled in 2001, is based on permitting records
from 27 of the state’s 35 local air districts. The Bay Area air district and some
rural districts were unable to provide the necessary data because they did not
require BUG owners to obtain permits, so they are not included in the database.
The inventory documents the owner, location, and specifications of each BUG
300 kilowatts and larger. The CEC inventory is the most complete record of
BUGs in California.
How close is too close: The Risk Zone
People in close proximity to BUGs are exposed to more harmful diesel emissions
than those living and working further away. In this report, Environmental Defense
has attempted to determine the “risk zone” for BUGs, or the area surrounding a
BUG in which people are exposed to concentrations of diesel pollution that result
in unacceptably high health risks. We chose as a threshold a cancer risk of one per
million, consistent with regulatory benchmarks. Our analysis focused on five cities
where most BUGs are located-San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, Fresno,
and Sacramento.
Even if BUGs are operated as little as 100 hours per year—the limit of typi-
cal permits—the surrounding risk zone ranges from 63 to 118 acres. That’s 10 to
20 average city blocks. In general, the more BUGs are used, the larger the risk
zone. Since BUGs are concentrated in densely populated areas, expanding the
risk zone means increasing the number of people exposed to unacceptably high
levels of pollution.
BUG HOT SPOTS ARE COMMON IN MAJOR CALIFORNIA CITIES
Our risk zone analysis also demonstrates that many BUGs are located close enough
to each other that their risk zone circles
overlap. Health risks may increase
considerably when individuals are
exposed to emissions from more than one
BUG. Figure 8-5, page 52, shows that in
the San Diego area, BUG clusters occur
both inside and outside the core down-
town area. We found many similar BUG
hot spots throughout California in cities
such as Los Angeles, Fresno, and Sacra-
mento.
THE BURDENS FALL DISPROPORTIONATELY ON THE POOR, ELDERLY,
AND MINORITIES
By integrating demographic data with the CEC BUG inventory, we show that in
each of the districts we analyzed, the population within the BUG risk zone is
more likely to be low income, elderly, and of a racial minority. While absolute dif-
ferences are sometimes small, they are generally statistically significant, and the
pattern of disparities is consistent across districts. In some instances the propor-
tional differences are substantial: For example in the Sacramento metropolitan air
district the proportion of elderly residents within the risk zone is 26% higher than
Figure 8-5. See page 52 for full-color version.
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for the entire district. BUG areas also tend to have higher existing background
concentrations of diesel pollution, so emissions from BUGS affect a population
that is already disproportionately burdened.
BUGs affect the health of over 150,000 schoolchildren 
To better analyze the impact on children, who are most vulnerable to developing
asthma or other respiratory ailments from air pollution, we examined the proxim-
ity of primary and secondary schools to BUGs in the four surveyed districts. We
found that over 200 schools are within the boundaries of a BUG risk zone (see
“School children’s exposure to BUG emissions, operation as permitted,” below).
Based on this mapping exercise and the average enrollment of a California school,6
we estimate that over 150,000 school children may be exposed to unacceptably
high emissions from BUGs in just the four districts studied. Statewide figures
would be significantly higher.
Schoolchildren’s exposure to BUG emissions, operation as permitted
Air district Schools within Risk Zone Estimated children enrolled
South Coast 140 96,600
San Diego 27 18,630
San Joaquin Valley Unified 34 23,460
Sacramento Metro 18 12,420
Policy recommendations
California’s recent electricity shortages highlighted the critical role BUGs
play during outages, but also illuminated regulatory gaps and potential abuses.
The California Air Resources Board (ARB) and many of the local air districts
already have taken several important steps to remedy these problems.
Following are Environmental Defense’s recommendations to reduce toxic
emissions from diesel BUGs.
• Adopt uniform permitting requirements for BUGs
All California air districts should require BUGs of 50 hp and larger to have per-
mits so that local air regulators will know how many BUGs are in their districts,
where they are located, and who owns them. This information will make it
possible for the districts to enforce appropriate restrictions on BUG use.
• Confine BUG use to emergencies
Air districts should ensure that BUG use is confined to true emergencies—
those rare occasions when natural disasters or other events cause a loss of grid
power at the site where the BUG is located. All air districts should adopt the ARB
definition of an emergency: “when electrical or natural gas service fails or emer-
gency pumping for fire protection or flood relief is required.”7 Air districts also
should make clear that compensated curtailments do not justify BUG opera-
tion. All load-shedding programs should explicitly forbid using BUGs to meet
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curtailment calls or respond to price signals. Program operators should require
BUG owners to inform the local air district of their participation in real-
time pricing programs, interruptible rates or other load-shedding programs.
• Require pollution controls on BUGs
The California Air Resources Board’s staff has proposed tough new emissions
standards for BUGs to take effect in 2004. These call for BUG owners to
reduce emissions of diesel PM by 85% and to comply with a 0.15 g/bhp-hr
diesel PM emission rate or to replace any existing BUG with one that meets
the requirements for new BUGs. New or rebuilt BUGs greater than 50 bhp
would be required to meet an emissions standard of at least 0.15 g/bhp-hr.
Environmental Defense supports adoption of these proposed standards by
the Board. In particular, the oldest engines-for which no retrofit technology is
available to meet the new emissions standards-must not be grandfathered. A
strict timeline needs to be established for replacing or retiring these BUGs.
• Adopt effective enforcement measures
Even if emissions limits are implemented, effectively enforcing restrictions
on operating hours will be essential to guarantee that emissions remain
below acceptable levels. Because BUGs are expected to run only a few dozen
hours per year, the proposed new standards allow BUGs to emit fine parti-
cles at 15 times the rate allowed for prime engines, which typically run for
hundreds of hours. The different emissions limits make sense only if BUGs
stay within their allotted annual operating hours.
In addition to the ARB’s recommendation that air districts require run-
time meters, BUG owners should be required to maintain records of hours
of operation, purpose of operation (i.e. testing, maintenance, emergency),
and the nature of emergency hours. This data should be reported once a
year and made available to the public.
To ensure honest reporting, the air districts should conduct routine inspec-
tions of meters and run-time logs. Once emissions limits are implemented,
inspectors should verify that control equipment has been installed. At large
facilities, regular inspections should be expanded to include BUGs. The major-
ity of BUGs, however, are located at facilities that would not otherwise be
inspected. To provide an effective deterrent, a program of random inspections
should be instituted for these facilities, with severe penalties for violations.
• Use financial incentives to reduce pollution from BUGs
The legislature should consider providing direct financial incentives to retro-
fit or retire the dirtiest diesel BUGs. In fact, $14 million allocated to lessen
the impacts of increased BUG use during last year’s electricity shortages was
axed from the budget in the first round of cuts. It should be restored.
• Encourage alternative backup power sources
Cleaner options for backup power exist or are being developed. Although
some on-site fuel storage considerations must be addressed, fuel cells are an
especially promising alternative. Because fuel cells are a relatively new tech-
nology, operating experience must be gained to ensure they are an efficient
xand reliable option. Facilities planning backup power upgrades should intro-
duce fuel cells to provide this experience.
• Protect the public’s right to know about risks from BUGs
The ARB plans to expand the inventory to include all BUGs. In addition to
data on engine characteristics and type of use, Environmental Defense recom-
mends that the inventory include information on engine location, ownership
and retrofit status. The legislature should allocate sufficient funds to ensure that
the inventory will be comprehensive and that ARB can update it as new BUGs
are permitted and retrofits are completed. The inventory should be available in
an easy to access form on ARB’s Web site so that Californians can find out
if there is a BUG near where they live, work, or go to school. In addition,
the air districts should collect and make available data on BUG run-times.
Conclusion: The health risks of BUGs are too high to ignore
By keeping essential functions running during an emergency, backup generators pro-
vide a critical service. But BUGs are the dirtiest form of power generation available,
and their use threatens the health of millions in California and across the nation.
These engines especially impact the health of the most vulnerable: children, the
elderly, and low-income and minority groups. Increased reliance on BUGs sets a
dangerous precedent. Standards to reduce pollution from BUGs are critically
needed. In addition, BUG use should remain confined to true emergencies and
cleaner alternatives should be put in place to protect the health of all citizens.
1More than 11,000 diesel backup generators, or BUGs, can be found at California
factories, offices, data centers, government buildings, hospitals, sewage treatment
plants, and other facilities. BUGs are large diesel engines similar to those found in
Greyhound buses, 18-wheel trucks, or even locomotives. Because they are in-
tended to operate only in the rare event of a power failure, they lack even rudi-
mentary pollution controls. When BUGs do operate—during emergencies but
also for routine testing and maintenance—their smokestacks belch out a highly
toxic brew of smog-forming chemicals, fine particles, and cancer-causing com-
pounds. The height of a typical BUG stack is no more than a few feet, so the peo-
ple living, working, and going to school nearby are the most affected. Eventually
a BUG’s emissions are dispersed, adding to the already excessive exposure to diesel
pollution that most Californians face.
Before California’s recent electricity supply shortages, policymakers paid little
attention to BUGs. Indeed, many of the local air districts, which have primary
jurisdiction over BUGs, did not even require their owners to have permits. The
crisis that began with surging wholesale electricity prices in the summer of 2000
and progressed to recurring rolling blackouts between December 2000 and May
2001 created new notions of what constituted an emergency. Facing dire predic-
tions of dozens to hundreds of hours of outages during the upcoming summer,
some California leaders looked to BUGs for salvation. Lawmakers and regulators
drew up proposals to systematically dispatch BUGs during stage 2 and 3 alerts
and even to provide new financial incentives for businesses to buy BUGs. Sud-
denly it appeared likely that these very dirty engines, which previously had oper-
ated only during rare events like earthquakes, fires, and severe storms, might run
for hundreds of hours. Making matters worse, these measures would have
increased BUG pollution during the summer afternoon hours when California’s
smog problems were already at their worst.
Fortunately, Californians were spared the nightmare scenario of frequent sum-
mer blackouts that many experts had predicted. But even before it became clear
that conservation and new federal price caps would get them through the sum-
mer, California air regulators, progressive legislators, and environmental groups
banded together to prevent the implementation of such extreme measures. Plans
by the administration of Governor Gray Davis to dispatch BUGs were quietly
shelved, and proposed legislation to provide tax credits for BUG purchasers died
in committee. But thousands of new BUGs were installed at facilities throughout
California, and the available evidence indicates that on average, BUGs were used
more often during the energy crisis.
Depending on which expert you consult, today California is either emerging from
the woods or in the eye of the hurricane. Optimists point to the host of new power
plants that have already come on line or are in various stages of regulatory review
or construction. Pessimists worry about the difficulty that power plant developers
currently face in financing new projects or note that federal price controls are set
to expire later this year, once again exposing California to the ravenous power
marketers increasingly seen as the architects of last year’s crisis. If the pessimists
are right, shortages could soon return, and BUGs could once again emerge as the
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2antidote. Even if shortages do not materialize, California’s newly expanded fleet
of BUGs still poses a significant public health threat that merits greater oversight.
This report presents the results of a comprehensive study of California BUGs
conducted by Environmental Defense. Our analysis looks both backward and for-
ward. Looking back to the summer of 2001, we ask what might have happened if
BUGs had been systematically dispatched as planned; what the health conse-
quences would have been. Looking ahead, we evaluate the risks of both routine
testing and maintenance and the more extended operation of BUGs as distrib-
uted, or small scale, power sources. Although the regular operation of BUGs to
replace grid power is illegal, they may be used anyway, because the air districts’
limited enforcement capabilities mean that the detection and punishment of per-
mit exceedances are highly unlikely.
We also look at how the health risks of BUG emissions are distributed
throughout California, using a detailed inventory of large BUGs developed by the
California Energy Commission (CEC). By combining the CEC inventory with
detailed demographic, land use, exposure, and health status data in an integrated
database, we were able to examine the environmental justice implications of the
increased use of BUGs.
The remainder of the report is organized as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the
kinds of engines typically used for emergency generation and offers a statistical
overview of California’s BUG population. Chapter 3 analyzes the types of facilities
at which BUGs are located and presents the findings on the geographic distribution
of BUGs. Chapter 4 describes the regulation of BUGs in California. Chapter 5 out-
lines the policy issues relating to BUGs, those that arose during California’s elec-
tricity shortages as well as emerging concerns. Chapter 6 summarizes the scientific
literature on the health risks of exposure to emissions from diesel engines like BUGs.
Chapter 7 describes the findings from the original research that Environmental
Defense commissioned, quantifying the public health risks of various scenarios of
BUG operation. Chapter 8 details the results of Environmental Defense’s geo-
statistical analysis of the distribution of health risks from near-field exposure to
emissions from BUGs. Finally, chapter 9 concludes the report with Environmental
Defense’s policy recommendations for California lawmakers and regulators.
3Diesel generators are a common source of emergency backup power in California
and across the United States. A combination of low capital costs, quick start-up, and
high overall efficiency have made diesel BUGs a popular option for both business
and residential consumers.8 Because BUGs are intended to operate only infre-
quently, they lack even basic pollution controls, making them the dirtiest form of
distributed power. Other sources of backup power exist, or are currently being
developed, that will provide comparable efficiency and reliability in the case of a
power failure, without jeopardizing the health and safety of those who live nearby.
Most people have seen the dirty black plume of exhaust spewed out by diesel
trucks or construction equipment. Diesel backup generators are similar to these
engines in size, but because they lack even basic controls, they emit more dangerous
pollution (see Figure 2-1). The average BUG in the CEC inventory is about 600
horsepower (hp), or about 450 kilowatts (kW),9 just slightly larger than the engine
of an 18-wheel truck. Although the majority of BUGs in California are under
300 kW, some diesel BUGs are as large as 2000 to 4000 hp (1.3 to 2.6 MW), the
same size range as locomotive engines. Figure 2-2 gives an idea of the size range
of BUGs compared with other engine types.
BUGs represent just one subsection of a larger category of diesel engines.
Diesel engines can be divided into stationary sources, those that generally remain
in one location for their entire lifetime, and mobile sources, those that move from
location to location. Mobile sources include on-road engines, or all vehicles on
the road that run on diesel fuel, and off-road engines. This category includes vehicle
equipment, such as cranes and bulldozers, and portable generators, many of which
CHAPTER 2
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FIGURE 2-1
A diesel BUG
4are used in construction and moved from one work site to the next. Portables can
also be used as backup generators. BUGs fall under the stationary engine cate-
gory, along with prime engines. Prime engines differ from BUGs in that they are
permitted to run on a regular basis, usually to supplement or substitute for energy
from the power grid.
The greater dependence of businesses and public services on an uninterrupted
source of power and the current unstable energy situation in California has caused
the purchase and use of BUGs to grow (see Chapter 5). Indeed, because diesel
BUGs and other forms of backup power often are vital to maintaining public
health and safety, providing hospitals and other public services with a constant
supply of power, many of these facilities are required by building codes or other local
ordinances to have some form of backup generation on site in case of emergency.
Except for routine maintenance and testing, BUGs are usually permitted to
run only during emergencies, which, in most air districts, means during an unfore-
seen failure of the regular electric power supply from the grid or of on-site equip-
ment (see chapter 4 for details of district regulations). When this happens, a BUG
owner is allowed to operate the engine for as long as the facility is without power. In
the event of an earthquake, flood, or fire, BUGs are also allowed to run, serving as
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FIGURE 2-2
Size of BUGs relative to other common diesel engines
5a power source for services such as pumping water and emergency lighting.10
BUGs are not required to meet the more stringent emission controls that apply to
longer-running prime and off-road engines. Prime stationary and nonroad engines
are required to be equipped with pollution control equipment that will allow them
to pass federal Clean Air Act requirements for new or modified sources of air pollu-
tion. Most air districts have established standards for nitrogen oxide (NOx) and car-
bon monoxide (CO), although they have not set standards for diesel particulate
matter (PM).11 BUGs are not required to meet such standards. The California Air
Resources Board (ARB) has proposed airborne toxic control measures (ATCM)
for emissions of PM from all stationary engines, whether prime or emergency.
California’s BUG population
The California Air Resources Board estimates that at present, more than 16,000
diesel engines are located throughout the state, including both emergency standby
and prime engines.12 Using district permitting records and extrapolating from
census population data when district permit data were not available, the ARB
estimated that more than 11,300 of these engines were BUGs. The ARB also
estimated the diesel PM and NOx emissions for all engines and found that the
emissions levels of the 4,804 prime engines were three times higher than those of
the 11,300 BUGs. Note that these numbers are estimated, not measured, and
assume that all engines are operated as permitted. Diesel prime engines, which
run longer hours, are believed to have significantly higher aggregate emissions
than BUGs. However, with the large number of BUGs in California, even a small
increase in the number of these engines’ annual operating hours would mean a
dramatic increase in their total emissions.
In 2001, the California Energy Commission (CEC) compiled an extensive and
detailed inventory of diesel BUGs in the state, based on permitting records from 27
of the state’s 35 local air districts13 (see Table 2-1). The Bay Area Air Quality Man-
agement District (AQMD) and some rural districts were unable to provide the
necessary data because until 2001 they did not require BUG owners to obtain per-
mits.14 This inventory documents the owner, location, and physical specifications of
each BUG of 300 kW and larger that was permitted in the state before April 2001.
TABLE 2-1
Summary of the California Energy Commission’s BUG inventory
NUMBER OF BUGS Total diesel generating
Source Diesel Non-Diesel Total capacity (MW)
South Coast AQMD 1,967 67 2,034 1,694
San Diego County APCD 478 5 483 324
San Joaquin Valley Unified APCD 302 11 313 219
Sacramento Metro AQMD 281 5 286 223
Monterey Bay Unified APCD 111 1 112 76
Mojave Desert AQMD 59 3 62 35
Yolo/Solano AQMD 58 1 59 47
All Other Air Districts 215 69 284 215
Total 3,471 162 3,633 2,833
* Only very limited data are available from the Bay Area AQMD. No data exist for Calaveras, Siskiyou, Modoc, Lassen, Tuolumne, Northern Sonoma, or
Northern Sierra Air Districts. Since these data are incomplete, they are omitted from this summary.
6Although there are many BUGs smaller than 300 kW across the state, the CEC
inventory was originally compiled in order to catalog the larger BUGs available for
dispatch to avert rolling blackouts during the energy crisis. Because the CEC inven-
tory is the most complete record of BUG locations across the state, we chose to use
it as the basis for our analysis and will refer to it throughout this report. It is important
to note that the CEC inventory is only a partial snapshot of California’s BUGs in
early 2001 and does not include the new BUGs acquired since that time.
The South Coast Air Quality Management District, which includes Los
Angeles and surrounding communities, is home to more than half the BUGs in
the state. Almost one-third of the state’s BUGs are in San Diego, San Joaquin
Valley, and Sacramento. The majority of the documented BUGs in the state are
diesel engines. Of the total number of BUGs listed in the CEC inventory, 96 per-
cent use diesel fuel, and 93 percent of the megawatts are produced by diesel
engines (see Figure 2-3).
PORTABLE ENGINES
Portable engines, often referred to as off-road engines, are used all over California
for agricultural irrigation, commercial construction, dredging, drilling, and military
tactical support activities. Although they operate much like diesel BUGs, these
engines often are smaller and mounted on wheels for added mobility. The ARB
estimates that more than 49,000 portable diesel-fueled engines are operating
statewide.15 Approximately 85 percent of the state’s portable engines are located in
the five air districts surveyed in this report, with 16,000 in the South Coast district
alone. Most portable engines are used for short-term activities in various locations.
Some facilities, however, regularly use portable engines, such as aircraft ground
support at major airports, dredging equipment at harbors, waste reduction equip-
ment at landfills, and oil and gas well drilling at oil and gas fields. Portable gener-
ators are regulated at the district level by local registration and regulation programs
and also a voluntary statewide registration program.16 During California’s recent
power shortages, portable engines were widely used for backup electricity supply.
7%
93%
Diesel MW
Non-Diesel MW
Diesel as percent of total MW capacity
FIGURE 2-3
The majority of BUG generating capacity is diesel-fueled
Source: Derived from California Energy Commission, “BUGS 1: Database of Public Back-up Generators (BUGS) in
California,” August 15, 2001.
7Cleaner alternatives to BUGs
Although diesel-fueled generators are the most widely used sources of distributed
generation in California, other technologies provide the same reliability and power
benefits without the high levels of air pollution associated with diesel. Figure 2-4
shows the differences in polluting emissions from various distributed generation
technologies, of which diesel BUGs and their alternatives are a subset. For every
pollutant listed, diesel engines clearly rank the highest, with four times more CO and
five times more NOx emissions than natural gas engines, the second highest polluter.
Only a few sources of distributed generation are cleaner alternatives to diesel
generators for backup power.17 Some technologies, such as alternative-fuel IC
engines, are already commercially available. Emerging technologies, such as fuel
cells, whose availability is currently limited, will be more widely accessible in the
coming months and years.
ALTERNATIVE-FUEL INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINES
Internal combustion (IC), or reciprocating engines, are the most common distrib-
uted generation technology. Although IC engines run primarily on diesel, they
can also use cleaner-burning fuels like natural gas, propane, gasoline, and landfill
gas. Although most IC engines require pollution controls, their emissions rank
the highest of the distributed generation technologies. IC engines fueled by nat-
ural gas, despite its being much cleaner than diesel, emit comparatively high lev-
els of dangerous air pollutants.
FUEL CELLS
Fuel cells, first used as an energy source for U.S. spacecraft in the 1960s, have
recently been developed for use as distributed generation. Only one of the three
types of fuel cells is now commercially available, but given the recent technologi-
cal improvements and the large investments by NASA, auto companies, and util-
ities, the market for this technology is growing rapidly.18
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Polluting emissions from distributed generation technologies
Source: Distributed Utility Associates, prepared for the California Air Resources Board, Air Pollution Emissions
Impacts Associated with Economic Market Potential of Distributed Generation in California. June 2000.
8A fuel cell converts hydrogen and oxygen into electricity and heat.19 It is much
like a battery that can be recharged while power is being drawn from it. But
instead of being recharged by using electricity, a fuel cell uses hydrogen and oxy-
gen. Because natural gas is the primary source of this hydrogen, fuel cells have
fewer emissions than from any other fossil fuel-burning technology. Besides the
emissions associated with turning natural gas into hydrogen, the emissions from
fuel cells are mainly CO2 and water. With further development, especially in
resolving difficulties with on-site fuel storage, fuel cells will be able to supply an
emissions-free source of hydrogen.
9BUGs can be found in commercial and office buildings, hospitals, and govern-
ment facilities all over California, most often in or near urban centers where the
majority of Californians live, work, and go to school.
California is swarming with BUGs
Figure 3-1 shows that BUGs exist in every air basin but that most are found in
the South Coast and San Francisco air basins. Moreover, BUGs are not evenly
distributed across California or even within the air basins. Some are at isolated
sites on mountaintops or in the desert, but most are concentrated in densely pop-
ulated areas. Figure 3-2 charts the correlation between population density and
BUG location in California. Urban centers like Los Angeles, San Diego, and
Sacramento have the most BUGs. In sum, BUGs are where the people are.
This pattern is consistent within cities as well. Using the CEC inventory, we
overlaid the location of BUGs in major urban areas on population density data
from the 2000 U.S. Census. Figure 3-3 shows that in the Los Angeles area, BUGs
tend to be clustered in the darkest shaded areas where the population is most
dense. This makes sense because BUGs are used in office buildings and commer-
cial centers. We observed similar patterns for other major California cities.
Land use is important to consider when determining the types of people and
places affected by BUG emissions. To better understand the distribution of BUGs
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CARB estimates of the number of diesel BUGs by air basin: 2000
Source: California Air Resources Board, "Diesel Risk Reduction Plan: Appendix 2 Stationary and Portable Diesel-Fueled Engines." page II-13, 2000.
Air basin No. of BUGs
South Coast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5350
San Francisco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2021
San Joaquin Valley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964
San Diego . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877
Southeast Desert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 548
Sacramento Valley. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 544
South Central Coast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428
North Central Coast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Mountain Counties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
North Coast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Lake Tahoe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Lake County. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Northwest Plateau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Great Basin Valley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11344
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for different land uses, we used U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) land coverage data
to differentiate commercial, industrial, and transportation zones and high- and
low-density residential areas from regions where other land uses predominate.20
Figure 3-4 lays out our analysis of Los Angeles. When the city’s BUG population
is overlaid on the land use map, most of the area’s BUGs are found in areas used
for commerce, industry, or transportation. But as the map also shows, these areas
are closely surrounded by high- and low-density residential areas. This means that
even though most BUGs inhabit nonresidential areas, they still are very near
where people live. Similar patterns were evident for other California cities.
Because BUGs are used mostly during business hours, we next looked at not
only where people live but also where they work. Figure 3-5, which overlays the
BUG locations on a map of worker density (employees per square mile) in Los
Angeles County, shows that BUGs are also concentrated in areas where people
work,21representing an additional risk to people working in urban and commercial
centers who are already heavily exposed to dangerous pollutants.
BACKGROUND EXPOSURES
Most BUGs are found in areas of California where air pollution is already a seri-
ous problem. According to Figure 3-6, the greatest concentration of BUGs is in
FIGURE 3-6
PM10 concentration and diesel BUGs by air basin
The 2002 California Almanac of Emissions and Air Quality, Appendix B: Air Quality Trend Data by Pollutant: Ozone,
PM10, CO, NO2, SO2
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air basins with the highest particulate matter (PM) exposures. A growing body of
research has shown that particulate matter contributes to asthma, allergies, car-
diopulmonary disease, and premature death. Even though the contribution of
BUGs to California’s overall particulate matter is small, incremental exposures
from BUGs in these already heavily polluted areas should be avoided.
FACILITIES WITH BUGS
Our analysis of the CEC’s BUG inventory revealed that BUG ownership is highly
diverse. Because the CEC’s database provided the name of the facility where each
inventoried BUG is located, we were able to classify the BUGs by facility type:
commercial/industrial, government and utilities, medical, telecommunications,
and educational (see Figure 3-7).
Many BUGs are located at facilities where backup power is essential to, and
required for, saving lives or protecting public health and safety. For example, 16
percent are located at medical facilities, mostly hospitals. Facilities classified as
government and utilities account for almost a third of the classified BUGs and
include city, county, and state government buildings and offices; prisons, police
services, and military facilities. Facilities classified as utilities are municipal water
districts, sanitation facilities, and municipal or public utility providers.
Almost half the classified BUGs are located at facilities owned by private
companies, which we assigned to the commercial and industrial or telecommuni-
Hospitals
Medical facilities, including hospitals, health clinics, and medical centers, make
up approximately 16 percent of classified BUG facilities from the CEC inventory.
Today’s hospitals depend on electricity more than ever before. Almost every
aspect of patient care, especially monitoring and critical life support systems,
depend on increasingly large supplies of reliable power.
National and state electrical codes have been upgraded to reflect the grow-
ing need for an uninterrupted power supply. Regulations developed by several
authorities, ranging from the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHCO), to the
state of California, cover almost all hospitals that have emergency diesel gener-
ators. The National Electric Code 517-13 and the California Electrical Code
require all hospitals and critical care facilities to have backup power systems
that can be running at full capacity within ten seconds after power failure.
Several leading hospitals are looking for alternatives to traditional diesel gen-
erators, and fuel cells have proved to be clean and reliable. The major benefit of a
fuel cell system is its extremely low emissions. In addition, its design provides
greater protection against failure than does the average hospital diesel unit.
Many hospitals in California are currently upgrading their facilities to meet
new seismic requirements as well as the requirement of the Office of Statewide
Health Planning and Development (OSHPAD) that they have three days of backup
generation in place. While switching completely to fuel cells may not be feasible
at present, the decision to introduce fuel cells slowly into the backup power mix
at certain facilities will increase their operating experience and eventually lead to
a wider range of options for cleaner, less polluting backup technologies.
Source: Clean Energy Group, Materials from “Draft Report on Fuel Cell and Health Care Project,” 2002.
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cations categories. Commercial and industrial facilities include hotels; entertain-
ment, manufacturing, electronics, financial, and insurance corporations; and com-
munications. Many rely on backup generation to safeguard against business
disruptions and the consequent financial losses.
Server farms, or data centers, are a prime example of a business that cannot
afford to let the lights go out. Clustered mostly in Silicon Valley and parts of the
Los Angeles metropolitan area, they require enormous amounts of electricity to
run their computers. To ensure a reliable power supply, many have installed diesel
BUGs. According to the CEC inventory, one company, Exodus Communica-
tions, has 30 BUGs located at three different server farm facilities in the Los
Angeles area.
Medical
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Education
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Government
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15%
FIGURE 3-7
Classification of facilities with BUGs
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The primary responsibility for regulating diesel BUGs in California belongs to
the 35 local air quality management districts. Because no emissions controls are
now required for BUGs, the districts are concentrating on limiting the BUGs’
annual number of operating hours and enforcing compliance with these limits.
Until the California Air Resources Board draws up new emissions standards for
BUGs and the BUGs are retrofitted or replaced, how well the local air districts
can regulate the operation of diesel BUGs will determine the impact of BUG
emissions on public health and the environment.
Air quality management districts
While district permit requirements for most internal combustion engines require
controls on emissions of criteria air contaminants, most districts exempt diesel
BUGs from such controls.22 Because BUGs are expected to operate purely in the
event of an emergency, or for basic testing and maintenance purposes, the districts
do not require them to meet the same strict standards as those engines permitted
to run more frequently.
Environmental Defense surveyed the permitting regulations of the five air
districts that account for more than three-quarters of California’s BUG pop-
ulation: the South Coast AQMD, San Diego AQMD, Sac Metro AQMD, Bay
CHAPTER 4
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TABLE 4-1
BUG regulations and enforcement in the five surveyed air districts
District Minimum hp Year Max annual Max annual Run-time meters
requiring permits hours of hours for required?
permit first operation testing and
required maintenance
Bay Area AQMD 50 hp 2001 Unlimited 100 hours Required for all
emergency (200 for BUGs>50hp but
situation hours essential not all equipped
services)
SAC Metro AQMD 50 hp 1977 200 hours 100 hours Required for all
post-1991 BUGs;
almost all engines
equipped.
South Coast AQMD 50 hp 1988 200 hours 50 hours Required for all
new BUGs; older
engines (pre-1990)
not required.
San Diego AQMD 50 hp 1995 Unlimited 52 hours Required on all
emergency post 11/00 engines
situation hours and by 2002 for all
other engines.
San Joaquin Valley APCD 50 hp 1991 Unlimited 200 hours Not required for
emergency BUGs.
situation hours
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Area AQMD, and San Joaquin Valley APCD. As outlined in Table 4-1, the basic
regulations for diesel BUGs are fairly consistent throughout the districts. Only
BUGs 50 hp and larger are required to obtain a permit to operate23 but the dis-
tricts did not always require BUGs of even this size to obtain a permit. In San
Diego, BUGs smaller than 500 hp were not regulated until 1995, and in the Bay
Area, all engines smaller than 250 hp were exempt from regulation until May
2000.24
Hours of operation
Because their emissions are not now controlled, the pollution released from diesel
BUGs is limited by the amount of time they run. The main permit condition for
diesel BUGs is a ceiling on the annual number of hours of operation. All the dis-
tricts we surveyed cap the number of hours that a BUG may run for testing and
maintenance purposes. South Coast and San Diego set the limit at 50 to 52 hours
per year, respectively. The Sacramento Metro and Bay Area AQMDs set the limit
at 100 hours, and the San Joaquin area’s BUGs and those located at essential pub-
lic service facilities, such as hospitals and police stations in the Bay Area, are
allowed to run up to 200 hours for testing and maintenance.25
Of the five air districts surveyed, only the Sacramento and South Coast dis-
tricts place an upper limit on the annual number of hours of BUG operation. The
200-hour annual maximum limit set by both districts is equivalent to running a
BUG for more than half an hour a day, every day, for a year.
The critical determinant of overall run time, and ultimately the total amount
of emissions from diesel BUGs, is the districts’ definition of what constitutes an
emergency. Most air districts define an emergency as an unforeseen failure of reg-
ular electric power supply from the serving utility or of on-site equipment or of
emergency water pumping in the event of a fire or flood.26
Enforcement and monitoring
Determining exactly when and for how long it is safe to run diesel BUGs is the
first step in regulating their operation. It is the second step, enforcing these regu-
lations and monitoring BUGs to ensure compliance, that is vital to preventing the
serious health risks caused by diesel BUG emissions.
METERS
For its run time to be tracked accurately, a BUG must be equipped with a meter
that measures its hours of operation. Most BUGs purchased within the last few
years come with a nonresettable meter that clocks its operation hours, just as the
odometer on a car records the number of miles driven. But because many of the
older engines are not equipped with such meters, their run time cannot be reliably
monitored. Neither the Sacramento Metro nor the South Coast AQMD requires
that engines purchased before 1990 have meters. Those bought before 1990 in
San Diego are required to install meters this year. The Bay Area AQMD, which
until now had no meter requirements, requires that beginning this year, all BUGs
in its district be equipped with meters. And even though many BUGs in the San
Joaquin Valley do have meters, the district still has no meter requirements. This
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lack of strict and uniform metering requirements throughout the state illustrates
the difficulty of ensuring compliance.
INSPECTION
Another important aspect of enforcing permit restrictions is the districts’ inspec-
tion and reporting systems. At all five of the air districts surveyed, inspection is
supposed to be annual, but the staff at most districts admitted that BUGs were
often inspected only once every two years or even less frequently. In many dis-
tricts, the number of engines is far greater than the number of available inspec-
tors, who must inspect both emergency generators and all engines permitted in
the district. Consequently, some districts extend the required time between inspec-
tions; for example, the San Joaquin Valley APCD inspectors review smaller
engines only once every three years.
During inspections, district personnel review the BUG owners’ records of the
annual number of hours of operation. The BUG owners are required to keep these
records for up to two years and to make them available to district inspectors upon
request. Little is known, however, about the general frequency and length of BUG
use, as most districts have no centralized aggregate reporting of BUG run time.
Instead, the districts use the number of hours permitted to calculate the total
number of hours run. Some districts are currently conducting studies to get a bet-
ter idea of BUG run time. It is important to note, however, that without run-time
meters, inspection cannot consistently verify the number of run time hours
reported in operating logs.
When inspectors do find that a BUG has been run more than the number of
hours allowed by the operating permit, they can impose penalties on the owner,
usually a monetary penalty, which can be up to $1,000 per day. In the Bay Area
and South Coast districts, BUGs consistently run more than the permitted hours
lose their emergency standby status and are required to be retrofitted to meet the
stricter emissions standards of a prime engine.
State and Federal policies for BUGs
The districts directly manage the permitting and enforcement of BUGs’ opera-
tion, but they also incorporate the state and federal permitting requirements and
guidelines in their programs. Federal regulation focuses on controlling mobile
sources of diesel exhaust, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
has established diesel fuel registration and formulation regulations that affect the
fuels used by BUGs in California. Another federal regulation that applies to Cal-
ifornia’s diesel engine population is the federal Clean Air Act amendments of
1990 (CAA), which preempt state and local authorities’ control of emissions from
new farm equipment under 175 hp. Because local air districts do not require diesel
engines used as farm equipment to obtain a permit, their operation and emissions
are virtually unregulated.27
The state’s air pollution regulator, the California Air Resources Board, has
more influence on diesel BUG regulation than the EPA does. Although the ARB’s
central responsibility is to control emissions from mobile sources of diesel exhaust,
it also is responsible for guiding the local districts on setting standards and estab-
lishing permitting requirements for stationary sources. The ARB’s Diesel Risk
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Reduction Plan also provides support in reducing particulate emissions from
diesel-fueled engines.
California’s Diesel Risk Reduction Plan
In 1998, following a ten-year review, the ARB identified particulate matter (PM)
from diesel exhaust as a toxic air contaminant. Because of the high risk associated
with PM, the ARB directed its staff to create a plan to significantly reduce diesel
emissions. The Diesel Risk Reduction Plan (DRRP) proposes to reduce, in three
steps, diesel PM emissions by about 85 percent from current levels. The first step
sets new regulatory emission standards for all new on-road, off-road, and station-
ary diesel-fueled engines and vehicles. The second requires that existing on-road,
off-road, and stationary engines and vehicles be retrofitted with pollution controls
when it is determined to be technically feasible and cost effective. And third, new
diesel fuel standards will be established to reduce the sulfur content of diesel fuel
to ensure the best result from advanced diesel PM emission controls.
The DRRP also recommends the development of airborne toxic control
measures (ATCMs) to define emissions control requirements for emergency back-
up generators. The plan places separate limits on PM emissions from new BUGs
and on those already in use, treating them as two distinct categories. Although it
still is in draft form, the proposed ATCMs require both new and existing BUGs
to meet strict PM standards of 0.15 g/bhp-hr by 2004.28 In contrast, existing
prime engines will be required to meet a PM standard of 0.01 g/bhp-hr or to be
replaced with a new engine that meets the stricter standards.29 The more stringent
requirements for prime engines are based on the assumption that they operate for
more hours than BUGs do. The ARB staff hopes to achieve the planned reduc-
tion of up to 105 tons of diesel PM by 2010, reducing PM emissions by at least
85 percent.
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California’s more than 11,000 diesel BUGs were originally intended to be used
only in emergencies such as fires, floods or earthquakes that caused a loss of grid
power on site. But in 2001, the collapse of California’s restructured electricity
market and the utilities’ ensuing financial crises led to a near constant state of
emergency and new notions of what constituted an emergency. Rolling blackouts
across the state and the extensive curtailment of those customers that opted for
interruptible rates during the winter and spring of 2001 confronted BUG owners
with more (in some cases, a lot more) hours of service interruptions than experi-
enced in a typical year, leading to an increased use of BUGs.
As summer approached, these unprecedented circumstances led policymakers
to consider paying businesses to run diesel BUGs during peak load periods to
prevent further rolling blackouts. Some local air quality management districts
revised their restrictions on diesel BUGs’ run time to facilitate their use as black-
out “busters.” Although blackouts and the systematic dispatch of diesel BUGs
were averted last summer, neither threat has been eliminated: although power
supplies appear sufficient this summer, California’s notorious transmission bottle-
necks may cause local shortages at any time of year. More ominously, the recent
cancellations of several power plant construction projects raise the possibility that
the boom-bust roller coaster of California’s electric generation sector may again
bring blackouts. Furthermore, electricity rate schedules for large customers and
new load-shedding programs may provide financial incentives for unauthorized
BUG use in excess of permitted levels.
THE PROLIFERATION OF BUGS DURING THE ENERGY CRISIS
With blackouts looming on the horizon, retailers, manufacturers, e-commerce
firms, and local governments scrambled to make sure that service interruptions
would not disrupt their operations. Even though many businesses and com-
munities made significant efforts to conserve energy, for some avoiding the
blackouts also meant buying or renting BUGs. In January 2001, a Bay Area Cater-
pillar dealer reported that the backlog for his $400,000, 2 MW generators had
grown from two months to five months, and a Southern California generator
retailer observed that inquiries from frightened business people had increased
three- to fourfold.30
Newspaper accounts of the energy crisis frequently described businesses’ and
local governments’ plans to acquire diesel BUGs. For example, Costco was
reported to be considering buying or leasing BUGs for its more than 75 California
stores,31 and high-tech firms Sun Microsystems, WorldCom, and Web site host
Verio all received permits for BUGs from the Bay Area AQMD.32 Municipal
utilities also turned to BUGs to keep the power flowing when the indepen-
dent systems operators (ISOs) could not deliver the juice. Alameda’s public util-
ity leased four tractor trailer-size portable 1.5 MW diesel BUGs. Healdsburg,
Santa Clara, and Palo Alto initiated similar backup plans for their municipal
utilities.33 Municipalities bought or rented diesel BUGs to ensure that their
offices34 and vital facilities such as sewage treatment facilities could operate during
a blackout.35
CHAPTER 5
What constitutes an emergency?
20
Home owners, too, sought insurance against anticipated blackouts. Home Depot
saw a surge in sales of portable, manual generators. “The sales are comparable to
the Y2K scare,” said a Corona Home Depot sales representative, noting that sales
of portable generators had doubled since the onset of the crisis.36
The rush to acquire BUGs translated into a surge in permit applications sub-
mitted to California’s local air regulators. In late 2001, the California Air Pollu-
tion Control Officers’ Association (CAPCOA) surveyed its members to assess the
effects of the crisis on BUG ownership and operation and found that “a signifi-
cant number of new engines were permitted and registered in California.”37 Twelve
air districts, including the five most populous, responded to a survey of new per-
mits for BUGs. These 12 districts reported that 3,064 new diesel BUGs had been
permitted since the start of the crisis, in most cases at least a 400-percent increase
over previous permit activity. The CAPCOA was unable to obtain data on the use
of portable generators but noted that “district inspectors have widely reported an
increased presence of the registered engines in the field.”
EXISTING BUGS MAY HAVE RUN MORE HOURS
Due to the lack of centralized reporting of BUGs’ operating hours, less is known
about how much longer BUGs ran as a result of the crisis. From the available sta-
tistical and anecdotal evidence, it appears that the average run time did increase
during this period, for two reasons. First, between June 2000 and December 2001,
California experienced a total of 103 hours of rolling blackouts, 796 hours of stage
3 emergencies, and 650 hours of stage 2 emergencies,38 and many BUG owners
turned to backup power during blackouts or in anticipation of them. BUGs also
may have been used more often because of the ISOs frequent shutdowns of cus-
tomers that had opted for the lower rates of interruptible power. Another reason
that BUG use may have increased during the crisis is that their owners began
testing their engines more frequently to ensure that they would be available when
a blackout actually occurred.
When power supplies first became tight during the summer of 2000, the Cal-
ifornia ISOs began relying on a little known tool—interruptible contracts—to
keep the lights on. Interruptible contracts are special deals usually offered to large
industrial and commercial customers that agree to cut their electricity use for a
limited number of hours per year in exchange for lower utility rates. Participants
who fail to turn off their power when called are assessed penalties. After years of
few or no curtailments, the utilities’ interruptible customers were called as many
as 20 times during the summer of 2000, and these calls resumed with increased
frequency in December 2000 when the market meltdown began in earnest.
Indeed, by February 2001 Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) had shut down the
power of its interruptible customers so many times that it had already reached the
program’s annual ceiling of 100 hours. Southern California Edison (SCE) had
used 50 percent of its annual limit of 25 events or 150 hours.39 Pointing to the
many years of discounted rates that these customers had received, the California
Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) asked them to continue heeding the ISOs’
curtailment calls voluntarily.
The ISOs’ extensive reliance on the interruptible contracts, however, turned
California’s power shortages into a financial emergency for these customers,
which were confronted with difficult choices. Some accepted the business dis-
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ruptions; others simply ignored the calls and accrued penalties; and some counted
on their BUGs to help them weather the service interruptions. For example, air-
plane parts manufacturer Moog Inc.’s Torrance operations plant first responded to
SCE’s curtailment calls by sending its 350 workers home, then accumulated thou-
sands of dollars in fines, and finally looked to BUGs for economic salvation. The
company leased a 1500 kW diesel generator to supplement its existing 500 kW
unit. Plant operations manager Dan Aynesworth told the Los Angeles Times, “If
we really get into a bind, we’ll run the damn generators whether the air quality
management district likes it or not. We won’t be the only ones in this boat. I’m
hoping that the gravity of this situation will allow the AQMD to relax the per-
mitting requirements.”40
Such choices were especially hard for local governments and other public
entities participating in SCE’s interruptible program. Enticed by discounts and
the perception that outages were unlikely, many of them had enrolled in the pro-
gram, even though they lacked the necessary operating flexibility. The result was a
poor compliance rate.41
Faced with non-compliance penalties of $13,000 per hour, Ventura County
endured 27 voluntary outages between June 2000 and February 2001.42 The black-
outs disrupted work in county offices, delayed trials and crippled the main jail.
Ventura County supervisors voted in May 2001 to purchase additional diesel gen-
erators to supplement existing BUGs and ensure that back-up generation was
enough to keep the county’s Government Center running at 100% during the
voluntary shutdowns. The generators enabled the county to stay on the discounted
interruptible rate, avoiding penalties or quitting the program, which would have
obliged the county to repay the more than $300,000 in discounts it received dur-
ing 2001.43
Evidence assembled by the CAPCOA and the South Coast AQMD strongly
suggests that BUGs did run more hours during the crisis. The CAPCOA
surveyed its members on changes in diesel fuel consumption, and the South
Coast AQMD assembled a sample of data on engine run time between July 1999
and September 2001. The CAPCOA concluded that as a result of the crisis,
“existing engines experienced higher than baseline use.”44 Eight of the 11 air dis-
tricts that responded to the survey reported that diesel fuel use at stationary
sources had risen during the crisis. The greater use of BUGs by customers in the
utilities’ interruptible programs may have accounted for some of the increase.
CAPCOA noted anecdotal evidence that “the sources reporting the largest
increases in BUG use over the baseline have these contracts in place.”45 The sur-
vey also uncovered anecdotal evidence of longer run times and operation incon-
sistent with permits:
Districts have also identified other examples of increased engine operation,
based on reports from field inspectors, complaint investigation, and isolated obser-
vances. Examples include hospital operation to cut energy costs, banks running
BUGs to guarantee secure systems, increased municipal use of BUGs for a variety
of reasons, and load shedding and peak-shaving at industrial and commercial
facilities, as well as residential uses.46
Consistent with this anecdotal evidence, the CAPCOA also noted a 15 per-
cent statewide increase in the production and sale of CARB diesel47, which they
concluded was “significant during what is clearly an economic downturn.”48
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Our analysis of the South Coast AQMD’s sample of engine run-time data
confirms that BUG use was higher throughout the crisis.49 Figure 5-1 contrasts
the average number of hours of BUG operation with the number of hours of stage
1, 2, and 3 alerts by quarter for July 1999 through September 2001. During each
three-month period from July 2000 to June 2001, the average number of hours of
BUG use was at least 20 percent higher than that during the corresponding period
12 months earlier, before the crisis started. In the first three months of 2001, the
average number of hours of operation was nearly double that of the same period
in 2000. January to March 2001 was the worst period of the crisis when 85 hours
of rolling blackouts occurred50 and interruptible customers were shut down most
frequently. The South Coast AQMD data show that although most engines oper-
ate no more than a few dozen hours a year, a few engines run much more. A hand-
ful of engines reported operating for more than 300 hours that year. The South
Coast AQMD’s survey also revealed that many BUG owners do not consistently
maintain the records required for enforcement, that almost one-third of the per-
mittees reported no data for at least one quarter.
BUGS AS BLACKOUT BUSTERS
As the summer of 2001 approached, genuine supply shortages loomed, and experts
predicted as many as 260 hours of rolling blackouts.51 State government officials
scrambling to secure all available electricity generation resources looked to a sys-
tematic dispatch of BUGs as a means of avoiding outages. In May 2001, Gover-
nor Gray Davis was reported to be considering issuing an executive order that
would have paid BUG owners to operate during stage 3 alerts.52 S. David Free-
man, one of Davis’s advisers, outlined the governor’s plan: “The backup generators
will help us get through the summer.”53
In preparation for this initiative, Governor Davis directed the California
Energy Commission (CEC) to investigate the generating capacity that BUGs
could contribute to the grid. The CEC’s investigation resulted in the creation and
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BUGs operated more during California electricity shortages,
summer 2001
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publication of the inventory of large (> 300 kW) BUGs that is the basis for the
GIS analysis contained in this report. The inventoried BUGs, which account for
fewer than a third of all the BUGs statewide, have a total generating capacity of
3233 MW, equivalent to three nuclear reactors or ten new base-load gas-fired
power plants. Portable BUGs of more than 300 kW numbered 969 and added
another 825 MW to the total.
Governor Davis was not alone in looking to BUGs to supplement the state’s
generating resources. On May 3, 2001, San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E)
sought permission from the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) for
a new program that would pay customers to operate their BUGs during stage 3
emergencies. The idea was that when the independent systems operators asked
SDG&E to reduce its load during stage 3 emergencies, it could call on partici-
pants to switch on their BUGs instead of instituting rolling blackouts. While the
program would have reduced the number of unexpected outages for San Diegans,
it also would have led to the systematic operation of participating BUGs, thereby
significantly increasing the surrounding population’s exposure to harmful diesel
emissions. The San Diego AQMD filed comments with the CPUC supporting
the program.
Despite opposition from the ARB and environmental groups, the CPUC
approved a modified version of SDG&E’s plan, dubbed the Rolling Blackout
Reduction Program.54 By August 2001, SDG&E reported to the CPUC that it
had enrolled 35 customers in the program. These customers owned 136 engines
with a total potential load reduction (and hence BUG capacity) of 73.56 MW.55
Although most air quality regulators tried to curb BUG use during the crisis,
some legislators attempted to weaken their authority and make it easier for the
BUGs to run longer. In February 2001, State Senator Rico Oller (R, Granite Bay)
introduced a bill that would have suspended any state or local regulations that
restricted BUG operation during stage 1, 2, and 3 emergencies. This bill could
have allowed hundreds of hours of BUG operation, as there were more than 500
hours of staged alerts between July and December of 2000,56 and the shortages
were expected to be much worse in 2001. Oller’s proposed legislation would not
only have exposed Californians to much higher BUG emissions, it would also
have made taxpayers pay for the privilege. In addition, the bill would have created
new incentives for Californians to buy BUGs, by providing a 100 percent tax
credit for the cost of buying and installing one.57 Fortunately, Oller’s bill stalled in
committee and never became law.
THE RESPONSE OF LOCAL AIR QUALITY REGULATORS
The blackout threat and financial pressures faced by interruptible customers shone
a spotlight on the local air districts, which have primary jurisdiction over BUGs.
The air regulators faced intense pressure to relax restrictions on the BUGs’ oper-
ations to facilitate their use as blackout busters. But with a few exceptions, the
districts generally held the line against an unconventional use of BUGs (to the
extent permitted by their limited enforcement resources) and also helped discour-
age implementation of some of the more extreme measures proposed at the height
of the crisis.
Some districts did, however, temporarily expand the definition of an emer-
gency to allow BUGs to operate for extended hours. Executive orders issued by
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the Sacramento Metro and South Coast AQMDs allowed essential services (e.g.,
hospitals, police, prisons, schools) to operate their BUGs for 400 and 500 hours,
respectively, during actual or imminent blackouts.58 The San Diego AQMD and
the San Joaquin Valley APCD altered their diesel BUG regulations to include
independent systems operators’ stage 3 emergencies, in which their operating
reserve falls to less than 1.5 percent, as an acceptable circumstance for BUG oper-
ation. The South Coast AQMD expanded its emergency allowance to include
both ISO stage 2 and 3 electrical emergencies and actual or imminent blackouts.
These modifications of district regulations, although temporary, greatly expanded
the allowance for diesel BUG operation throughout California during the sum-
mer of 2001.
DEMAND RESPONSE PROGRAMS COULD LEAD TO WIDER BUG USE
New programs being devised to prevent last year’s shortages may create new
incentives for the unconventional and greater use of BUGs. Many of the studies
of California’s energy crisis stressed the importance of expanding programs that
make electricity demand more responsive to short-term price fluctuations.59 The
common theme of all these programs is creating incentives or imperatives for par-
ticipating customers to curtail their electricity consumption when supplies are
tight and spot prices soar. Such programs can yield both financial and environ-
mental benefits to all ratepayers by lowering utilities’ power procurement costs,
reducing the operation of polluting peaking plants and deferring the building of
new generating facilities.
Without proper safeguards, program participants may simply substitute
energy from dirty BUGs for costly but cleaner central station power. Apparently
at least some interruptible customers fired up their BUGs last year when asked to
curtail their grid power use. Environmental advocates and air quality regulators
recognized this risk in 2001 when the California independent systems operators
were designing their summer 2001 demand relief program, which offered cash
payments in exchange for load reductions during periods of peak demand. Cali-
fornia air quality regulators successfully dissuaded the ISOs from recruiting BUG
owners to participate in the demand response programs, but concerns remained
that the programs might create new incentives for unauthorized BUG operation.
Most California air districts do not consider compensated curtailments to be
emergencies justifying BUG operation, but the ISOs’ confidentiality agreements
with program participants have stymied their enforcement. Air regulators have no
way of knowing which permittees are participating in the ISOs’ programs. ISO
senior operations engineer Ali Amirali explained that “generation owners have the
responsibility to work with local air districts. We leave the onus on them.”60 But
CAPCOA chair Fred Thoits countered that the program created incentives that
encouraged BUG owners to gamble that they wouldn’t get caught, noting that
“the ISO’s incentives to run dwarf our fines.”61
The role of backup generation remains a critical concern in designing demand
response programs in California and elsewhere. Many utilities and independent
system operators throughout the country now operate or are planning to operate
such programs. Two recent studies of existing utility programs and tariffs found
that customers with on-site generation (which includes, but is not limited to,
BUGs) were more likely to participate in them.62 An analysis of Duke Power’s
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dynamic pricing program found that “customers with self-generation respond sig-
nificantly to electricity prices above a threshold point at which self-generation
becomes economical.”63 In a recent survey of 627 North American businesses by
Primen, the market intelligence affiliate of the Electric Power Research Institute,
94 percent of those respondents who considered themselves strong candidates to
acquire on-site generation in the next two years said that they “would be willing
to dispatch their generators during peak demand if given the proper incentives.”
Among the likely adopters (more than 10 percent of those sampled), 54 percent
admitted that diesel generators were their “preferred technology.”64 Unless BUG
owners are explicitly prohibited from participating or air quality regulators are
apprised of who they are, an increase in unauthorized BUG operation remains a
potential drawback of these otherwise beneficial programs.
BUGS COULD BE USED AS “UNDER THE RADAR”
DISTRIBUTED GENERATION
In addition, some BUG owners may be operating their BUGs to save money on
their utility bills. The complex rate structure for the large industrial and commer-
cial customers that are most likely to own BUGs includes both energy and
demand charges. Just as it is on residential and small commercial customers’ bills,
the month’s total energy use (measured in kilowatt-hours) is multiplied by an
energy charge. Energy charges for large customers are lower than for small users,
because their bills also include one or more demand charges which are calculated
based on their maximum rate of consumption during peak hours. Demand charges
can account for a substantial component of large customers’ monthly utility bills.
Within a range of realistic assumptions about fuel prices, the cost of generating
electricity with a diesel BUG exceeds the energy charges for large customers. But
BUG owners may be able to save by shaving their peak demand—and hence their
demand charge—if they routinely run their BUG during hours when they expect
their energy use to be highest. Savings are especially likely if a facility’s peak
energy use predictably occurs on summer afternoons, when system-wide demand
is greatest and demand charges are highest. This would be the case for large office
complexes whose summer demand for electricity is driven by the use of air condi-
tioning. Large customers with sophisticated energy management systems may
understand their consumption patterns well enough to devise such strategies.
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Diesel exhaust is a significant health concern. Formed mostly in the engines’ com-
bustion process, diesel exhaust is a complex mixture of particles and hundreds of
gases. Five influential governmental or scientific bodies have designated diesel
exhaust as a probable or potential human carcinogen; the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) is considering labeling it a probable human carcino-
gen.65 In 1998, the California Air Resources Board (ARB) listed diesel exhaust as
a toxic air contaminant (TAC).66 Because the EPA’s health assessment still is in
draft form, this chapter relies on the California assessment as the most credible
review to date of the health effects of diesel exhaust.
Recent studies have found that diesel exhaust contributes more than 70 percent
of all cancer risk from air toxics in the Los Angeles air basin,67 in California,68 and in
the entire United States.69 The risk from diesel exhaust is about ten times greater
than that from all other toxic air pollutants combined.70 Diesel exhaust also has
numerous acute and chronic noncancer effects on the respiratory, neurological,
and immunological systems of the human body.71 In addition, diesel exhaust con-
tains or creates four of the six criteria air pollutants: nitrogen oxides (NOx) and
volatile organic compounds (VOCs), both precursors to elevated ground-level
ozone, or smog; carbon monoxide (CO); and particulate matter (PM).
By far the largest sources of diesel exhaust are mobile sources (cars, trucks,
trains, etc.), but a nonnegligible fraction of diesel particulate matter is emitted
from stationary engines. This category includes engines used for agricultural
pumping, industrial processes, and backup electrical generation, or BUGs.72
Because most BUGs are located in densely populated urban areas and their emis-
sions of pollutants are relatively high, BUGs could have an amplified effect on the
health risks for people living or working nearby. This chapter surveys the evidence
for a range of the health effects from exposure to diesel exhaust.
WHAT IS DIESEL EXHAUST?
Diesel exhaust occurs as a gas, liquid, or solid and is a result of the combustion of
diesel fuel in a compression ignition engine. Its composition varies depending on the
type of engine, the operating conditions, and the presence of a control system,73
but it always contains both particulate matter and a complex mixture of hundreds
of gases. The principal gases are nitrogen, oxygen, carbon dioxide, and water vapor,
but diesel exhaust also contains carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, volatile hydro-
carbons, and low-molecular-weight polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH) and
PAH-derivatives, some of which are known or suspected to cause cancer.74
Diesel particulate matter (DPM) is actually not one solid particle but
groups of spherical carbon particles clustered together to form irregular shapes
(see Figure 6-1). The elemental carbon core can also contain small amounts of
trace metals.
By the time the diesel exhaust is released into the atmosphere, some of the
gases are present as vapors (“Gaseous Hydrocarbons” in Figure 6-1), while others
stick onto the surface of the particles (the “Soluble Organic Fraction”). Because of
its large surface area, DPM can adsorb large amounts of organic materials, some
of which have been identified as mutagenic or carcinogenic.
CHAPTER 6
What are the health risks from BUGs?
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Particles are released from diesel vehicles about 20 times faster than those
emitted by comparable gasoline-powered vehicles,75 a rate that may also apply to
stationary diesel-powered engines. DPM is typically fine (< 2.5 microns) or ultra-
fine (< 0.1 micron) in size; most of diesel exhaust particle mass has a diameter of
less than 10 microns, 94 percent less than 2.5 microns, and 92 percent less than
1.0 microns.76 While most of the mass of DPM ranges from 0.1 to 1.0 microns,
the majority of the particles (by number) are smaller than 0.1 micron. These
“ultrafine” or “nanoparticles” have a greater surface area for a given mass and thus
affect a larger surface area of lung tissue than does an equal mass of larger parti-
cles.77 Because of the preponderance of small particles, DPM is easily inhaled
deep into the lungs’ bronchial and alveolar regions, where their clearance is slow
compared with that of particles deposited on airways.78 Exposure to diesel exhaust
is mainly a result of inhalation, with an undetermined but likely insignificant frac-
tion from ingestion or through the skin.
More than 40 gaseous and particulate constituents of diesel exhaust are listed
as hazardous air pollutants by either the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
or the California Air Resources Board as toxic air contaminants (see Table 6-1).
At least 21 of these substances are listed by the state of California as known car-
cinogens or reproductive toxicants.
HEALTH EFFECTS OF VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF DIESEL EXHAUST
An uncontrolled diesel engine emits 30 pounds of nitrogen oxides per megawatt-
hour of electricity produced (lbs/MWh), whereas a comparable natural gas engine
without controls emits 5.9 lbs/MWh.79 Diesel engines also contribute significantly
to particulate pollution. In California, diesel exhaust contributes 3 and 8 percent
of the total statewide inventories of PM10 and PM2.5, respectively.80 Of this
amount, stationary and portable diesel electricity generators—the category that
includes BUGs—account for approximately 7 percent.81 Because of the low num-
ber of hours that BUGs are allowed to operate, they are estimated to contribute
only 0.5 percent of the total. But BUGs’ contribution to the overall health impacts
of diesel pollution may significantly exceed their share of emissions because they
tend to be located in densely populated areas.
Soluble organic fraction Soluble organic fraction
Gaseous hydrocarbons
FIGURE 6-1
Schematic of diesel particulate matter
Sources: California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment/Air Resources Board, “Proposed Identifica-
tion of Diesel Exhaust as a Toxic Air Contaminant,” P. ES-5.
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While much of the recent regulatory attention has focused on “whole diesel
exhaust” and DPM, many of the individual components of diesel exhaust have
health impacts worth noting. Diesel exhaust is found in ambient concentrations
of NOx and VOCs, both of which are harmful to the respiratory system.82 With
the addition of sunlight, these chemicals combine to form ground-level ozone, or
smog, a known lung irritant linked to asthma attacks and respiratory illnesses.
Particles with a median aerodynamic diameter of less than 10 micrometers
(PM10) have been epidemiologically associated with many adverse health effects,
including asthma attacks in patients with preexisting asthma; admission to hospi-
tals for cardiovascular and respiratory causes; and deaths from heart attacks,
strokes, and respiratory causes.83 Other studies have shown that the association
between PM exposure and premature death is stronger for particle diameters of
less than 2.5 microns (PM2.5) than for PM10.84 Researchers estimate that as
many as 60,000 Americans die prematurely each year because of exposure to fine
particles.85 Because diesel BUGs emit fine particles at extremely high rates, these
findings are especially worrisome for those exposed to high concentrations of
diesel particulate matter.
HEALTH EFFECTS OF WHOLE DIESEL EXHAUST AND DIESEL
PARTICULATE MATTER
Although the toxic contribution of each of the gaseous components of diesel
exhaust is substantial, the EPA concluded that the total carcinogenic effect esti-
mated for all these compounds does not account for the complete carcinogenic
effect of whole diesel exhaust.86 Only 50 to 90 percent of the mutagenic potency
TABLE 6-1
Toxic air contaminants and hazardous air pollutants found in diesel
exhaust 
Acetaldehyde* Chlorine Methyl ethyl ketone
Acrolein Chlorobenzene Naphthalene*
Aluminum Chromium compounds* Nickel*
Ammonia Cobalt compounds* 4-nitrobiphenyl*
Aniline* Copper Phenol
Antimony compounds* Cresol Phosphorus
Arsenic* Cyanide compounds POM (including PAHs)
Barium Dibenzofuran Propionaldehyde
Benzene* Dibutylphthalate Selenium compounds*
Beryllium compounds* Ethyl benzene Silver
Biphenyl Formaldehyde* Styrene*
Bis [2-ethylhexyl]phthalate* Hexane Sulfuric acid
Bromine Lead compounds* Toluene*
1,3-butadiene* Manganese compounds Xylene isomers and mixtures
Cadmium* Mercury compounds* Zinc
Chlorinated dioxins* Methanol
*This compound or class of compounds is known by the state of California to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity.
See California EPA, Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment, “Chemicals Known to the State to Cause
Cancer or Reproductive Toxicity,” May 31, 2002.
Note: This list of toxic air contaminants either have been identified in diesel exhaust or are presumed to be in the
exhaust, based on observed chemical reactions and/or presence in the fuel or oil. See California Air Resources
Board, “Toxic Air Contaminant Identification List Summaries, Diesel Exhaust,” September 1997, available online at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/toxics/tac/factshts/diesex.pdf.
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of whole diesel exhaust, however, is associated with DPM.87 While neither the gas
phase nor the solid phase alone explains the potency of diesel exhaust, studies
often use DPM as a surrogate measure for exposure to whole diesel exhaust. Thus,
depending on the study cited, the concentration of either whole diesel exhaust or
DPM is used as the exposure metric.
Acute health effects
Even a brief exposure to diesel exhaust can have immediate respiratory, neurolog-
ical, and immunological effects. Healthy volunteers exposed to diesel exhaust for
one hour showed a significant increase in airway resistance and increases in eye
and nasal irritation.88 Other symptoms caused by exposure to diesel exhaust
include coughs, headaches, light-headedness, and nausea.89 Epidemiological stud-
ies of occupationally exposed individuals (e.g., bus garage workers and miners)
found decreased lung function, increased cough, labored breathing, chest tight-
ness, and wheezing.90 Although all epidemiological studies of workers have limi-
tations—especially in regard to information about their exposure—they
consistently show respiratory impairment and corroborate similar findings in ani-
mal studies.91
Some experts believe that air pollution in general and DPM in particular may
be a cause of the greater incidence of asthma and other allergic respiratory dis-
ease.92 Furthermore, exposure to DPM can induce allergic reactions and localized
inflammation in humans.93 Even more interesting, simultaneous exposure to DPM
and ragweed pollen causes an allergic response greater than that from exposure to
either pollutant alone; similar results were found with Japanese cedar pollen in
animals.94 There also is some evidence that DPM exposed to ozone (at levels simi-
lar to those found in polluted urban air) has an enhanced inflammatory effect on
rat lungs compared with DPM not exposed to ozone.95 If confirmed, this result
could mean that DPM in polluted regions, like many in California, is much more
potent than previously believed.
Chronic noncancer health effects
A number of chronic health effects have been associated with exposure to diesel
exhaust, although the evidence for humans is more limited than it is for acute
effects. Some studies have found that long-term exposure in occupational settings
produced a greater frequency of bronchitic symptoms, cough, phlegm, and reduc-
tions in lung function.96 Test animals provided additional results, including chronic
inflammation of lung tissue and reduced resistance to infection in rats, as well as
significant noncarcinogenic pulmonary effects from long-term exposure in rats,
mice, rabbits, guinea pigs, and primates.97 Based on the animal studies, the EPA
established a chronic inhalation reference concentration (RfC) of 5 micrograms
per cubic meter (µg/m3); California’s Reference Exposure Level (REL) is set at the
same concentration. An RfC or REL is the concentration below which no noncancer
adverse health effects are likely to occur from a lifetime exposure (70 years), tak-
ing into account sensitive populations.
Carcinogenicity
Numerous governmental agencies and scientific bodies have determined the cancer-
causing potential of exposure to diesel exhaust. Even though all acknowledge the
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need for further research, especially on humans, the emerging consensus is that on
the basis of limited human studies and more robust animal findings, diesel exhaust
is a probable human carcinogen (see Table 6-2).
Dozens of epidemiological studies have found evidence consistent with a
causal relationship between diesel exhaust exposure and lung cancer.98 These stud-
ies formed the basis for most of the determinations cited in Table 6-2, including
that of the California ARB. Two metanalyses statistically examined the results of
23 to 30 epidemiological studies99 and concluded that the increased risk of lung
cancer associated with long-term, occupational exposures was, on average, 40 per-
cent,100 with higher risks in more heavily exposed subgroups.101 While this level of
elevated risk is considered weak evidence for causality, after extensive evaluation
in their review of the toxicity of diesel exhaust, the California Office of Environ-
mental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) determined that the association was
unlikely due to bias, confounding (e.g., cigarette smoking), or chance.102 However,
TABLE 6-2
History of determinations of the carcinogenicity of diesel exhaust
Agency Year Determination
National Institute for Occupational 1988 Potential occupational carcinogen
Safety and Health (NIOSH)
International Agency for Research 1989 Probable human carcinogen
on Cancer (IARC)
State of California (under provisions 1990 Known by the state to cause cancer
of Proposition 65)
Health Effects Institute (HEI) 1995 Potential to cause cancer
American Council of Government 2001 Suspected human carcinogen
Industrial Hygenists (ACGIH)
(proposed)
World Health Organization 1996 Probable human carcinogen
International Programme on
Chemical Safety (WHO-IPCS)
California Air Resources Board (ARB) 1998 Toxic air contaminant (determination
based substantially on the cancer
risk to humans)
U.S. Environmental Protection 2000 Probable human carcinogen
Agency (EPA) (proposed)
U.S. Department of Health and 2000 Reasonably anticipated to be human
Human Services National Toxicology carcinogen
Program (U.S. DHHS/NTP)
Sources:
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, “Carcinogenic Effects of Exposure to Diesel Exhaust,” Current
Intelligence Bulletin 50 (August 1988). Available online at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/88116_50.html.
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), Diesel and Gasoline Engine Exhausts and Some Nitroarenes. IARC
Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans, no. 46 (Lyons: World Health Organization, 1989),
pp. 41–185.
California Environmental Protection Agency, Chemicals Known to the State to Cause Cancer or Reproductive Toxicity
(Proposition 65, 1997), revised May 31, 2002.
Health Effects Institute, Diesel Exhaust: A Critical Analysis of Emissions, Exposure and Health Effects (Cambridge, MA:
Health Effects Institute, 1995). Available online at http://www.healtheffects.org/Pubs/diesum.htm, accessed on
January 20, 2002.
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, “Documentation of the Threshold Limit Values and
Biological Exposure Limits, Notice of Intended Changes,” 2001.
International Programme on Chemical Safety, World Health Organization, “Diesel Fuel and Exhaust Emissions,”
Environmental Health Criteria 171 (1996).
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because most of these studies used inadequate measures of exposure, uncertainties
remain as to whether diesel exhaust fully explains the cancer incidence observed.103
The composition of diesel exhaust and the results of animal and bioassay
studies provide additional evidence of its carcinogenicity. For example, DPM or
extracts from DPM are mutagenic in bacteria and mammalian cell systems.104
Many other studies have shown that diesel exhaust causes mutation in chromo-
somes and damage to DNA, processes that are believed to be important to the
causation of cancer.105 The carcinogenicity of diesel exhaust has been demon-
strated in test animals based on inhalation bioassays in the rat and, with less cer-
tainty, in mice.106 But even though rats show a consistent lung tumor response,
mice and hamsters have not demonstrated the same response.107 Because of uncer-
tainties in extrapolating results in animals to humans and in the animal results
themselves, OEHHA decided to base its risk estimates on the human data.108
SPECIAL RISKS TO VULNERABLE SUBPOPULATIONS
Even more susceptible to the health effects of diesel exhaust are vulnerable groups,
such as children, the elderly, the infirm (especially those who have existing respira-
tory problems), and those who have predisposed their lungs to increased particle
retention (e.g., from smoking, high particulate burdens from nondiesel sources).109
Recently, many researchers explored why children are an especially sensitive sub-
population. Air pollution affects children more than adults because they inhale
more pollutants per pound of body weight and have a more rapid rate of respira-
tion, narrower airways, and a less mature ability to metabolize, detoxify, and
excrete toxins.110 Children also spend more time outdoors engaged in vigorous
activities;111 athletes are similarly susceptible for this reason. Exposures that occur
in childhood are of special concern because children’s developmental processes
can easily be disrupted and the resulting dysfunctions may be irreversible.112 In
addition, exposures that occur early in life appear more likely to lead to disease
than do exposures later in life.113
HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENTS
The health risks of exposure to diesel exhaust are great. In fact, OEHHA stated that
the “long-term exposure to diesel exhaust particles poses the highest cancer risk of
any toxic air contaminant evaluated by OEHHA.”114 The first major study to in-
vestigate the contribution of diesel exhaust to people’s exposures to toxic air pol-
lutants was the Multiple Air Toxics Exposure Study (MATES-II), conducted by
the South Coast Air Quality Management District in 1998 and 1999. The results
were alarming: fully 70 percent of the cancer risk from air toxics for those living in
the Los Angeles air basin (one of the most polluted in the country) was due to
diesel particulate emissions alone.115 As a result of this finding, the ARB expanded
the study to include all of California. The findings were similar: about 70 percent
of the total inhalation cancer risk from air toxics for the average Californian is due
to diesel exhaust (see Table 6-3). This result is slightly lower than the estimate for
the United States as a whole: 80 percent of the total cancer risk from all haz-
ardous air pollutants is associated with the inhalation of diesel exhaust.116
A concentration below which no carcinogenic effects are anticipated has not been
determined.117 Based on the California exposure estimates, OEHHA calculated
the range of cancer unit risk to be 1.3 x 10–4 to 2.4 x 10–3 (µg/m3)–1, with 3 x 10–4,
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or, equivalently, 300 cases per million per (µg g/m3), as a reasonable point esti-
mate.118 A cancer unit risk represents the probability of a person’s contracting can-
cer (at the 95 percent upper confidence limit) as a result of constant exposure to
an ambient concentration of diesel exhaust of one microgram per cubic meter
over a 70-year lifetime.
The population time-weighted average diesel exhaust exposure concentra-
tions across all environments (both indoors and outdoors) in California is esti-
mated by OEHHA to be 1.54 µg/m3 in 1995 (2.2 µg/m3 outdoors and 1.5 µg/m3
indoors).119 OEHHA acknowledges that its analysis underestimates the true expo-
sure because of the lack of data for areas with elevated exposures. An organization
of air quality control officers used the California data to estimate the concentra-
tion of diesel exhaust throughout the country and found that on average, other
metropolitan areas would have concentrations one-half that of Los Angeles, and
nonmetropolitan areas, one-tenth that of Los Angeles.120
Based on their exposure concentration estimates, OEHHA estimates that the
number of potential additional cancer cases in California is 200 to 3,600 per year
(assuming a 70-year lifetime exposure to diesel exhaust) at the exposure concentra-
tions that it calculated.121 State and Territorial Air Pollution Program Administrators
and the Association of Local Air Pollution Control Officers (STAPPA/ALAPCO)
used their national estimates of the exposure concentrations along with the Cali-
fornia unit risk factor and estimated that across the United States, 125,000 addi-
tional cancers are caused by exposure to diesel exhaust.122
These cancer-risk figures are derived from averages and, as such, do not rep-
resent individuals’ actual exposures, nor do they take into account the greater
susceptibility of some groups, such as children, those with preexisting conditions, and
the elderly. In 1989, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) estimated that 1.35 million workers were occupationally exposed to
TABLE 6-3
Estimated statewide average potential cancer risk from outdoor
ambient air levels of air toxics for the year 2000
Compound Potential cancer risk* Percent contribution
excess cancers/million to total risk
Diesel exhaust PM10 540 71.2
1,3-Butadiene 74 9.8
Benzene 57 7.5
Carbon tetrachloride 30 4.0
Formaldehyde 19 2.5
Hexavalent chromium 17 2.2
Para-dichlorobenzene 9 1.2
Acetaldehyde 5 0.7
Perchloroethylene 5 0.7
Methlene chloride 2 0.3
TOTAL 758 100.0
*Diesel exhaust PM10 potential cancer risk is based on 2000 emission inventory estimates. All other potential cancer
risks are based on air toxics network data: 1997 data were used for para-dichlorobenzene, and 1998 monitoring
data were used for all others. Measured concentrations are assumed to be equivalent to annual average
concentrations, and the duration of exposure is 70 years, inhalation pathway only.
Source: California Air Resources Board, “Diesel Risk Reduction Plan,” October 2000, p. 16.
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diesel exhaust, many at significantly elevated levels.123 Owing to population and
economic growth, the numbers exposed today are probably much higher. Concen-
trations of diesel exhaust PM10 near freeways can reach as high as 10 µg g/m3,124
and concentrations in occupational and other near-source settings may be even
higher.125 Thus, individuals can be exposed to much greater cancer and noncancer
risk depending on where they live and work.
The ARB analyzed seven typical activities in which diesel-fueled engines are
used and calculated the potential range of excess cancer risks; the results can be
seen in Figure 6-2.126 They wanted to find out whether the operation of certain
diesel-fueled engines could expose nearby individuals to locally elevated DPM
concentrations. Their estimates assumed a 70-year exposure by the maximally
exposed individual at current concentrations. Ranges in the results are the result
of variations in assumptions of operating durations, stack parameters, facility sizes,
and meteorological conditions, among other things. As can be seen from these
results, being exposed to emissions from diesel BUGs could lead to an additional
100 cancers per year in a population of 1 million people, or 1 in 10,000; if those
same diesel engines were operated as prime engines (increasing their hours of
operation from less than 100 to several hundred hours per year), the excess cancer
risk would increase nearly tenfold.
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
BUGŁ
(operation as permitted) 
Truck stop
Low-volume freeway
Distribution center
Prime engineŁ
(unauthorized BUG use)
High-volume freeway
Potential excess cancers
(chances per million based on 70-years exposure)
FIGURE 6-2
Potential cancer risk range for activities using diesel-fueled engines
Source: California Air Resources Board, Risk Reduction Plan to Reduce Particulate Matter Emissions from Diesel-Fueled Engines and Vehicles, app. 5,
p. 17, October 2000.
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When a BUG is running, the people nearby are exposed to more harmful diesel
emissions than are the people living and working farther away. Our initial GIS
analysis, presented in Chapter 3, showed that BUGs tend to be clustered in parts
of California where both residential and worker populations are most dense. A
question that naturally follows is, how close is too close? Put in another way, how
large is the “risk zone” (the area surrounding a BUG in which people will be
exposed to incremental concentrations of diesel pollution that result in acceptably
high health risks)? Other questions are, what are the most important health risks
inside the risk zone, and how important are they? This chapter presents the results
of studies commissioned by Environmental Defense that explored these questions.
While exposures to fine particles—and health risks—are greatest in the
immediate vicinity of a BUG, its emissions are dispersed into the atmosphere and
contribute to the background, or ambient, concentration of diesel pollution in the
air basin in which it is located. A second question that Environmental Defense
examined was how much the increased operations of BUGs would contribute to
the overall exposure to diesel particulate matter and the associated mortality
statewide. This analysis concluded that even if the run time of California’s more
than 11,000 BUGs averaged as few as 25 hours per year, at least 20 deaths per
year would be attributable to BUG emissions. Many more deaths would result
each year with an increase in the annual average number of operating hours, which
could result from the systematic dispatch of BUGs as a peaking resource or from
the extended (i.e., by several hundred hours) operation of a few BUGs in violation
of permit restrictions.
METHODS
The health risk from toxic air contaminants emitted from diesel BUGs can be
estimated as the product of three elements: (1) the quantity of contaminant
released, (2) the increase in exposure concentration per unit release, and (3) the
risk of adverse effect per unit increase in exposure concentration. The first ele-
ment is determined by multiplying an emission factor by the amount of engine
use. The emission factor indicates the amount of pollutant emitted per unit of
engine use. Air dispersion models are used to evaluate the second element, which
is based on information about the emission’s characteristics and meteorology. The
third element is addressed by toxicity values, which quantify the risk of an adverse
health outcome’s occurring because of exposure to toxic substances such as diesel
particulate matter (DPM) and its constituents.
Government data on emissions factors and a regulatory-approved air dispersion
model were used to estimate exposures from BUG operations. Environmental
Defense commissioned Air Resource Specialists (ARS) from Fort Collins, Colorado,
to conduct air dispersion modeling of generic BUGs using weather data from five
California cities. Emission factors (EFs) were taken from the EPA’s compilation
of emission factors, known as AP-42.127 The specialists used a standard air disper-
sion model, Industrial Source Complex (ISC),128 to predict the increases in the
ambient concentration of diesel pollutants owing to atmospheric emissions from
individual diesel BUGs. ISC is a regulatory-approved model typically used (e.g.,
CHAPTER 7
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when permitting new sources) to determine the impact of emissions on the sur-
rounding community. Additional information on dispersion modeling and the
analysis performed by ARS is contained in Appendix B.129
Toxicity factors were derived from government sources and academic publica-
tions. The initial phase of this process was a screening analysis of the various
health risks associated with exposure to BUG emissions. The purpose of this pre-
liminary screening was to review the published literature on health risks from
diesel emissions in order to (1) identify the substances and health end points for
which the risk from BUG operations was greatest, and (2) determine toxicity fac-
tors for these substances and end points to use in the health risk assessment. This
analysis was performed by researchers from the University of California at Berke-
ley, who also conducted the health risk assessment described later in this chap-
ter.130 Their findings are summarized next and described in greater detail in
Appendix B.
The screening analysis encompassed three health risks typically considered in
a health risk assessment for toxic air contaminants and that have associated toxic-
ity values: acute, chronic cancer, and chronic noncancer risks. Acute health risks are
those resulting from short-term exposure, usually defined as less than 14 days,
whereas chronic health risks are associated with long-term exposures, usually
defined as longer than three months. The screening analysis also included an
assessment, based on recent epidemiological evidence, of a new category: direct
mortality effects due to the inhalation of particulate matter. A growing body of
scientific literature has demonstrated that elevated ambient PM levels correlate
with increased rates of morbidity and mortality in exposed populations.
This screening analysis determined that the direct PM mortality risk poses
the single largest concern for the health effects of diesel BUG emissions. In addi-
tion, of the three types of health risks typically considered in a risk assessment
(acute, chronic cancer, and chronic noncancer), chronic cancer risk poses the
largest public health concern. This finding was based on a comparison of pub-
lished values for chronic cancer and chronic noncancer toxicity. The most strin-
gent constraint appears to be the cancer risk for diesel particulate matter, which is
a mixture of many different chemical species. Based on the available data—which
are quite limited—acrolein was identified as the specific chemical constituent of
diesel exhaust most likely to cause acute health effects.
A toxicity value for direct PM mortality risk was derived using information
from peer-reviewed literature for populationwide exposure surveyed in an article
by the chairperson and the chief deputy executive officer of the California Air
Resources Board (Lloyd and Cackette 2001). Based on Lloyd and Cackette’s esti-
mated health outcome of 3,566 deaths/year in California owing to average ambi-
ent levels of 1.8 µg/m3 of direct PM2.5, and a state population of 33 million,
Environmental Defense’s consultants estimated that the toxicity was 60 deaths
per million per year per µg/m3.131 Lloyd and Cackette based their estimates of the
health effects from DPM on epidemiological studies that investigated the link
between ambient PM2.5 and population mortality. Given the size and chemical
composition of DPM, it is probably more toxic than ambient PM2.5. Thus, while
the studies that Lloyd and Cackette cited probably represent the best available
evidence of the risk of direct mortality effects from DPM exposure, the values
they used were based on studies of ambient PM2.5, and they therefore may have
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underestimated the true hazard posed by DPM. The values that Lloyd and Cack-
ette derived represent the risk to the general public. But the risks to sensitive pop-
ulations are likely to be even greater than for the general public. For diesel PM,
we expect the list of sensitive populations to include young people, the elderly,
and the infirm. It is important to note that this mortality risk is in addition to the
other effects calculated in this report (e.g., the chronic cancer risk).
Toxicity for chronic cancer risk is typically expressed as the lifetime (70 years)
risk of excess cancer cases per unit of exposure concentration. This value is multiplied
by the lifetime average exposure concentration to obtain the incremental cancer
risk. According to the California EPA, the cancer risk potency of diesel exhaust is
300 per million per µg/m3. This means that chronic exposure to one µg/m3 would
yield a lifetime excess cancer risk of 300 cases per million people so exposed.
An important difference between the direct PM mortality risk and the chronic
cancer risk is that the former is calculated based on one year of exposure, whereas
the later is calculated based on 70 years of exposure. While the PM2.5 risk value
of 60 per million per µg/m3 appears to be five times lower than the DPM chronic
cancer toxicity (300 per million per µg/m3), the former occurs after only one-sev-
entieth of the exposure, and thus after only one-seventieth of the intake. There-
fore, the direct mortality risk is estimated to be 14 times higher than the chronic
cancer risk (60 µg/m3 x 70 years of exposure equals 4,200 deaths per million
exposed per µg/m3, which is 14 x the chronic cancer risk of 300 per million
exposed per µg/m3).
PARTICULATE MATTER EXPOSURE FROM BUG OPERATION
ARS conducted air dispersion modeling for Fresno, Los Angeles, Sacramento,
San Francisco, and San Diego to find ground-level concentrations of PM10 on a
grid surrounding a generic BUG.132 Then ARS developed three sets of results for
each model run:
• The annual average, which is used to evaluate the chronic cancer risk from
exposure to diesel particulate matter. These results were also used to esti-
mate the direct mortality risk of PM2.5 exposure. Other chronic cancer and
chronic noncancer risks were not evaluated because the available evidence
indicated that they were less stringent than the chronic cancer risk from
DPM.
• The maximum 24-hour average, which is used to evaluate the likelihood of
exceeding the state of California’s 24-hour PM10 standard of 50 µg/m3.
• The maximum 1-hour average, which is used to evaluate acute risks for
acrolein and total PAH.
As illustrated in Figure 7-1, the results of air dispersion modeling are typically
presented as isopleth maps. Like a topographic map, which uses contour lines to
represent a three-dimensional landscape in two dimensions, isopleth maps show
how the average concentration of a pollutant diminishes when moving away from
the source.
Panels A, B, and C of Figure 7-1 present isopleth maps for PM10 emissions
from a 500 hp engine located in Los Angeles for 1-hour, 24-hour, and 1-year
averaging periods, respectively. The 1-year averages represent average modeled
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concentrations, and the 1-hour and 24-hour concentrations represent the highest
modeled concentration of PM10 at each point on the receptor grid. Note that the
maximum modeled concentrations at various points on the receptor grid may
occur at different days or hours, so the isopleth maps do not represent a snapshot
of concentrations for any particular day or hour. Instead, panels A and B summa-
rize extreme conditions over time and so are useful for determining whether reg-
ulatory limits for maximum exposures may be exceeded at the site. Panel C, an
annual average isopleth map, represents the average conditions in the vicinity of a
BUG over all hours in a year. This type of map is most useful for understanding
the contribution of cumulative exposures to chronic health effects.
Note that even though the figures are for the same location, they differ
markedly in both shape and orientation. The isopleths of maximum 1-hour and
24-hour concentrations occur in a roughly circular shape around the BUG. The
FIGURE 7-1
PM concentration (µg/m3) isopleths for a generic 500hp BUG in Los Angeles
Note: Grid measures distance from BUG in meters.
(a) Maximum 1-hour (b) Maximum 24-hours
(c) Annual average
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FIGURE 7-2
Cancer risk isopleths for a generic 500hp BUG running 100 hours per year
Notes: (1) Grid measures distance from BUG in meters. (2) Isopleth lines show incremental cancer risk per million resulting from BUG operation.
San Diego
Los Angeles
San Francisco
Fresno
Sacramento
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upwind and downwind concentrations are similar because the meteorology that
leads to the maximum 1-hour and 24-hour concentrations at a given distance is
likely to occur at least once during a year when the wind is blowing from any
direction. In contrast, the annual average concentrations tend to be higher in the
prevailing downwind direction. The reason is that the meteorology at a specific
location tends to follow consistent patterns over the course of a year. The case
illustrated in panel C of Figure 7-1 shows that the winds in Los Angeles blow
most often from west to east but that the next most common direction is east to
west. Therefore, the risks from chronic exposures in this region are concentrated
in a west-to-east corridor in the vicinity of the emissions.
BOUNDING THE RISK ZONE
By combining the results of the dispersion modeling with toxicity factors for
DPM, ARS was able to address the question, how close is too close? To summarize
the results of the dispersion modeling and facilitate its integration with the GIS-
based BUG inventory, Environmental Defense used the concept of a risk zone.
A risk zone is defined as the farthest distance away from the BUG when the
incremental chronic cancer risk from the BUG’s operation exceeds one per mil-
lion. This definition of the risk zone is consistent with existing regulatory bench-
marks, which establish the risk level that is small enough to be considered
insignificant, or de minimus. For example, the California EPA defines de minimus
to be one per million or fewer for chronic cancer risks,133 and OEHHA uses a risk
of one per million to define risk zones in analyzing urban-air toxic “hot spots.”134
The 1990 Clean Air Act allows sources to be exempt from regulation and residual
risk to be considered negligible when posing a risk of fewer than a one in a mil-
lion to the most exposed individual.135 In some instances, though, even a chronic
cancer risk of less than one per million may not be considered insignificant.136
To determine the extent of the risk zones, it was necessary to translate the
results from the dispersion modeling, which are expressed as the concentration of
DPM in the vicinity of the modeled BUGs (measured in µg/m3), into chronic
cancer risk. This was accomplished by multiplying the modeled annual-average
concentration of DPM by OEHHA’s toxicity factor of 300 excess cancer cases per
million per µg/m3 of DPM. Figure 7-2 illustrates the results of this calculation for
a 500 hp BUG running 100 hours per year during business hours (7:00 A.M. to
7:00 P.M.). The figures present isopleth maps for five California cities expressed
in terms of excess chronic cancer risk. In each diagram the contour line labeled
“1/million” represents the boundary of the area in which the incremental cancer
risk from BUG operation under that scenario is at least one per million. This
means that within that area, operation of the BUG increases each exposed indi-
vidual’s preexisting probability of contracting cancer by a factor of 1/1,000,000
over a 70-year lifetime. It is important to note that the overall health risk in this
area is actually much greater than one in a million, because the direct PM mortal-
ity risk is so much greater than the chronic cancer risk.
As illustrated in Figure 7-2, the risk zone may extend hundreds of meters
downwind of a BUG. Table 7-1 shows that the size of the risk zone depends on
how a BUG is operated, which varies among air districts because of the differ-
ences in meteorology. The table summarizes the risk zone parameters for a 500 hp
engine for the five cities and three operating scenarios. In general, the risk zone
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grows larger as the number of operating hours rises. The reason is that the cumu-
lative annual emissions climb in proportion to the number of hours of operation,
raising the total annual exposure at each point around the BUG. As annual expo-
sures increase at every point on the receptor grid, people farther and farther from
the BUG receive greater exposures, and the distance to a de minimus exposure
lengthens. Appendix B contains a table summarizing this risk zone analysis for
additional operating scenarios for both 500 and 1500 hp engines.
Operating BUGs for more than 200 hours per year is not typical, nor is it
generally consistent with permit restrictions. However, as discussed in Chapter 5,
the systematic dispatch of BUGs to avert blackouts during California’s recent
electricity shortages may have meant that some BUGs ran as long as 500 hours,
mainly during summer afternoons. Furthermore, the available evidence suggests
that some BUG owners have, and in some instances responded to, economic
incentives to substitute energy from their BUG for grid power. The systematic
operation of a BUG as distributed generation would mean that BUGs would run
for hundreds or more hours a year. This case is represented in Table 7-1 as Oper-
ation as Distributed Generation. Note that while the downwind distance to the
risk zone boundary increases with the number of operating hours, this trend does
not occur in the upwind direction. The reason is that the scenarios differ in both
the number of operating hours and when those hours occur.137
In order to extrapolate this analysis to the entire BUG inventory for each air
district analyzed,138 Environmental Defense developed a simplified summary mea-
sure of the risk zone. As illustrated in Figure 7-3, we substituted offset circles for
the irregularly shaped one-per-million contour lines shown in the isopleth maps.
The circles are offset in the direction of the prevailing wind direction, and their
diameter equals the sum of the distance to the one-per-million contour line in the
upwind and downwind directions. Although the risk zone circles in some places lie
outside the one-per-million cancer risk boundary (since these tend to be somewhat
elliptical), much if not all of the area they contain still has much more than a one-
per-million overall health risk owing to the added risk of direct PM mortality.
TABLE 7-1
Risk zone radii, or distance to one per million risk in meters
South Coast San San Joaquin San Diego Sacramento
Francisco Valley
Downwind Upwind Downwind Upwind Downwind Upwind Downwind Upwind Downwind Upwind
Scenario/wind direction NE SW SE NW SE SW SE NW NE SW
Operation as permitted
410 160 410 220 660 120 650 120 500 90100 hours, per year
7 A.M.—7 P.M.
Summer 2001 BUG
720 0 1100 110 1500 220 1300 0 1300 140
dispatch
500 hours per year
12—6 P.M.
June—Sept. only
Operation as distributed
1400 660 1400 860 2600 600 2600 540 1700 500generation1,000 hours per year
7 A.M.—7 P.M.
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The risk zone parameters for the Operation as Permitted scenario provide the
basis for the geostatistical analysis presented in Chapter 8, which compares the
demographic composition and cumulative exposures of the population within the
risk zone to the district at large.
Developing this simplified representation of the risk zones also enabled Envi-
ronmental Defense to investigate the issue of BUG clusters, in which BUGs are
close enough to one another that people are exposed to emissions from more than
one BUG. Clustering could lead to a total impact from BUGs on a person or
community that is higher than the impact from a single BUG. Chapter 8 also
presents the results of the analysis of BUG clusters.
INSIDE THE RISK ZONE
The cancer risk for people living or working inside the risk zone may be much
higher than one per million. Indeed, in that case, the isopleth maps depicted in
Figure 7-2 show that the cancer risk exceeds ten per million within approximately
FIGURE 7-3
Example of deriving risk zones for geostatistical analysis 
(100 annual hours), 500 hp engine
Risk zone
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100 meters of the modeled BUG. In the majority of cases analyzed, the modeled
concentrations yield chronic cancer risks at or above ten per million within close
proximity of the BUG. In many instances, risks are this high even when BUGs
are expected to run as few as 50 hours per year. This is significant because emis-
sions leading to risks in excess of ten per million trigger California’s Proposition
65, which requires that businesses139 provide a “clear and reasonable” warning
before knowingly exposing people to carcinogenic chemicals.140 Since 1990, diesel
engine exhaust has been included on the list141 of chemicals known to the state of
California to cause cancer, birth defects, or other reproductive harm.
Regulatory decisions are often made based on the risk at the location of a
hypothetical maximally exposed individual (MEI). The analysis indicates that
long-term health risks to the MEI from BUG operation are greatest on summer
afternoons, precisely when they would have operated had they been dispatched to
avert rolling blackouts during the summer of 2001. Figure 7-4 shows the esti-
mated cancer risk for each city and modeling scenario, assuming 100 annual hours
of operation. This metric—the maximum ground-level concentration for annual
average conditions—represents the long-term risk for the MEI who spends all his
or her time at the location of maximum average impact. In all five cases, the risk
based on the maximum-modeled concentration is much higher for the summer
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FIGURE 7-4
Maximum cancer risk from PM exposure, operation as permitted
(100 annual hours), 500 hp engine
TABLE 7-2
Number of violations of the State of California’s
24-Hour PM10 standard: 1999
Air basin Number of violation days
Sacramento Valley 66
San Diego 126
San Francisco 36
San Joaquin Valley 174
South Coast 258
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modeling scenario than for either the business hours or all-hours scenarios. Two
features of summer meteorology, increased air turbulence and more consistent
wind direction, cause this pattern.142
Particle emissions from BUGs are high enough that extended BUG operation
could cause local exceedances of California’s existing 24-hour standard for PM10.The
modeled concentrations presented in this report represent incremental increases in
concentration attributable to a generic BUG. In reality, as shown in Table 7-2, BUG
emissions take place in already polluted urban areas, where these health-based stan-
dards are already routinely exceeded. BUG operation on days when there already are
exceedances will exacerbate exposures, especially in the immediate vicinity of the BUG
where the PM concentrations are most elevated. As illustrated in Figure 7-5, the
maximum modeled 24-hour concentrations can be quite high. Although not high
enough to lead to local exceedances of the 24-hour standards owing only to BUG
emissions, these concentrations would be added to existing ambient concentra-
tions, greatly raising the possibility that a BUG would cause localized exceedances
of the 24-hour PM10 standard. This risk would be compounded in cases in which
two or more BUGs in close proximity are operating simultaneously.
In addition to fine particulate matter, diesel exhaust also includes specific
toxic chemicals, such as acetaldehyde, acrolein, 1,3-butadiene, benzene, formalde-
hyde, and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, many of which have been found to
be carcinogenic or to cause acute health effects.143 Little is known about the rates
at which these chemicals are emitted by stationary engines (such as BUGs), and
knowledge of their toxicities is also quite limited. A preliminary screening analy-
sis identified acrolein as the chemical most likely to pose an acute health risk from
BUGs. Using the available data on emissions factors and toxicity values, Environ-
mental Defense’s consultants tentatively concluded that the modeled 1-hour aver-
age concentrations of acrolein do not exceed acceptable exposure levels for specific
chemical compounds. This conclusion is tentative, because the data are incom-
plete regarding emission factors and toxicity values for the whole suite of toxic air
contaminants emitted from BUGs.
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Statewide Health Risk: Intake Fraction Analysis
As Chapter 3 explained, BUGs tend to be concentrated in densely populated
areas where the air quality is already degraded. These are also the parts of the state
where exposure to DPM is the highest. We have already used the results of dis-
persion modeling to show how health risks in the immediate vicinity of a BUG
would be affected by increased operation. Even though the relatively small num-
ber of people who live or work closest to a BUG will experience the greatest
impact from increased BUG operation, the entire population of the air basin will
be affected as the increased emissions elevate their exposure to ambient concen-
trations of DPM. Now we use a novel method, the intake fraction approach,144 to
quantify the populationwide health risks of operating BUGs. This approach
focuses on the chronic cancer and direct mortality risks resulting from increased
exposure to DPM. Unlike the risk zone analysis present earlier in this chapter,
here we consider the health risks that would likely result from higher levels of
photochemical smog caused by emissions of oxides of nitrogen from BUGs.
An intake fraction approach summarizes the impact of BUG emissions on
the total population’s intake of DPM and the incremental risk based on this expo-
sure.145 Three pieces of information are needed to calculate the excess population-
wide health-effect burden using an intake fraction approach: the intake-based
toxicity, the total amount of emissions from the source, and the intake fraction for
the source. This analysis employs the same toxicity factors discussed earlier in this
chapter. The total amount of emissions from all California BUGs were estimated
for various operating scenarios using the AP-42 emissions factors just described
and the engine size and population data from the California ARB and CEC
inventories. The intake fraction for DPM emitted by BUGs was derived using
public data from the California ARB on emissions and ambient concentrations of
DPM in California’s most populous air basins.
The intake fraction is the fraction of emissions from a source that are breathed
(taken in) by the exposed population. It is calculated as the ratio of the total intake,
summed over all people, and divided by the total emissions. The intake fraction
(iF) for inhalation of atmospheric emissions depends on three main factors:
TABLE 7-3
Estimated annual excess cancer and PM mortality
per year of BUG operation
Average annual Chronic cancer cases PM mortality
operating hours per year per year
per BUG of BUG operation of BUG operation
25 hours 1 20
50 hours 3 40
100 hours 5 70
250 hours 10 180
500 hours 30 360
1000 hours 50 720
Notes:
1. The mortality values in this table have been rounded from those in appendix 4 of the Health Risk Assessment
Study by Nazaroff and Marshall.
2. These estimates assume BUGs operate at full capacity. If the BUG idles or runs at less than full load, emissions
and health risks may be lower.
3. Based on the ARB estimate of 11,344 BUGs in California.
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• The proximity between the source and those exposed.
• The size of the population that is exposed to a source (and their breathing rate).
• The persistence of the pollutant in the environment.
Most DPM derives from mobile sources, which, like BUGs, are widely dis-
tributed throughout California’s air basins. Whether emitted by a mobile or a sta-
tionary source, DPM is nonreactive on the time scale of airflow through a basin
and thus equally persistent for the purposes of the iF analysis. Appendix C pre-
sents the data and calculations used to derive the iF used here.
For the DPM from BUGs, the estimated statewide average intake fraction is
15 per million. This means that 15 grams of DPM are inhaled for every million
grams (metric tonnes) emitted by BUGs. This estimate is consistent with intake
fractions of 7 to 31 per million previously calculated from similar data for primary
nonreactive pollutants from well-distributed sources in major California air basins146
(South Coast, San Francisco Bay Area, San Diego, San Joaquin Valley, and Sacra-
mento Valley).
Table 7-3 shows that the number of chronic cancer cases and PM mortality
from each year of BUG operation go up as the average annual number of run
hours rises. Even an average annual run time of just 25 hours (which is consistent
with the South Coast AQMD’s precrisis data discussed in chapter 5) would lead
to nearly two dozen deaths statewide each year based on the ARB’s estimate of
11,344 BUGs in California. A fairly conservative regimen of running an engine
half an hour per week for testing and maintenance would lead to 25 operating
hours per year. As the South Coast AQMD’s data and other anecdotal reports
suggest, many BUGs ran much longer during last year’s crisis, and the results pre-
sented in Table 7-3 show that the higher number of run hours would have led to
many additional deaths. The widespread dispatch of BUGs—as the Davis admin-
istration considered doing—could have caused dozens of extra deaths owing to
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PM mortality from BUGs with increasing unauthorized operation as
distributed generation
Annual operating hours for BUGs run as distributed generation. This analysis assumes that all other
BUGs operate 100 hours per year.
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operations in 2001 alone.147 It is important to note that the emission factors on
which these estimates are based assume operation at full load/capacity. But if a
BUG is idling, its emissions are smaller, and therefore so is the risk.
Although BUGs are permitted only for use during emergencies, the local air
districts’ limited policing resources means that some owners may operate their
BUGs for other purposes with little fear of detection and punishment. For exam-
ple, BUG owners participating in a demand-response program or facing a real-
time pricing tariff could substitute on-site power from the BUG for grid power
during a curtailment call or a period of high prices. Or BUG owners with a suf-
ficient understanding of their facility’s energy usage patterns could devise a strat-
egy of systematically running their BUG to shave their peak demand and lower
their utility bill.
Figure 7-6 shows that if even a small number of BUGs were used regularly as
distributed generation (instead of only for emergency standby operation), the
overall run time, emissions, and mortality could still rise significantly. For exam-
ple, assume that BUGs used for distributed generation run for 1,000 hours annu-
ally. If just 10 percent of the entire BUG population is operated as distributed
generation, the PM mortality will almost double. Although not illustrated here,
the number of cancer cases would also be expected to double in this example. This
analysis underscores the importance of ensuring that California’s air districts have
adequate means to verify compliance with permits and that penalties for noncom-
pliance are commensurate with both the rewards of cheating and the risks of get-
ting caught.
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People living, working, and going to school close to BUGs are most heavily exposed
to their toxic diesel emissions. Even under routine operating conditions individuals
within a few hundred meters of a BUG experience an unacceptable cancer risk and
may also be exposed to short-term concentrations of five particles that exceed the
state’s 24-hour standard. This chapter integrates the results of the health assess-
ment with Environmental Defense’s GIS database to examine how these risks are
distributed within each of four air districts that have high numbers of BUGs.
Our geostatistical analysis examines the impact of BUGs from an environ-
mental justice (EJ) perspective, asking how the burden of increased BUG emis-
sions is distributed among residents of these districts. We employ specific
demographic variables, which have been shown to be reliable indicators of com-
munities in which a disproportionate pollution impact may exist. These variables
include measures of race and ethnicity, age, and income level.148 Youth and elderly
residents are especially vulnerable to air pollution and they have been shown, like
racial minorities and low-income families, to lack adequate access to health care
and political and economic power. In addition this analysis explores the impact of
BUGs relative to cumulative exposures to air pollution and assesses the potential
for BUG hot spots.
By integrating demographic data with the CEC BUG inventory we show
that in each of the districts we analyzed the population exposed is more likely to
be low income, elderly, and of a racial minority than the larger population. We
also find that BUGs are clustered in the more densely populated areas of each dis-
trict. The areas where BUGS are located also tend to have higher existing background
concentrations of diesel pollution, so emissions from BUGS affect a population
that is already disproportionately burdened with diesel exhaust.
Demographic analysis
Using results from the risk assessment described in Chapter 7, we created risk
zone circles around each BUG. The diameter of a risk zone circle equals the sum
of the down and upwind distances in which a person would be exposed to a one-
in-a-million or greater cancer risk from PM emissions.149 Each of the four cities
in our analysis has a unique risk zone because of differences in wind patterns.
Using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) mapping, we drew risk zone cir-
cles around each BUG in the CEC inventory, offset in the downwind direction to
account for prevailing wind patterns. As shown in Figure 8-1, we then overlaid
the risk zone circle on demographic data from the 2000 U.S. Census.150
For the purposes of this analysis, the term risk zone refers to the entire non-
contiguous area covered by the risk zone circles. Combining these data enabled us
to compare the demographic characteristics of the exposed population (i.e. within
the risk zone) with the general population of each air district. To determine the
percentage of different groups residing within the risk zone, we multiplied the
percent of each subpopulation in each census block group by the percentage of its
area covered by the risk zone. We then compared this figure with the correspond-
ing percentages for the entire air district.
CHAPTER 8
Who bears the risks?
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For this analysis we looked at race and ethnicity in terms of white (non-Hispanic)
versus nonwhite as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau.151 We also broke the nonwhite
category down into individual minority groups: African-American, Asian-American,
and Hispanic or Latino. In addition, we focused on low-income households,
which we define as those earning $25,000 or less a year. Finally, we looked at age,
focusing on the young (under 18) and the elderly (65 and older). Both groups are
especially vulnerable to adverse health impacts from air pollution. In the discus-
sion below we use the term “EJ individuals” to refer to members of any of these
demographic groups.
We found that in almost all cases there is a statistically significant152 dispro-
portionate impact on EJ individuals within the risk zone in all four districts. At
the 5 percent level of significance, and even at the 1 percent level, we found a sta-
tistically significant difference between the risk zone and the district as a whole
for the three main EJ factors of race, age, and income. Although the absolute dif-
ferences are fairly small, they are sometimes proportionately large. To facilitate
comparisons between the demographic makeup of the risk zone and the district,
we created an “EJ Index,” which is a ratio of the percent of EJ individuals within
the risk zone divided by the percent in the district as a whole. When the EJ Index
is greater than one, the proportion of EJ individuals within the risk zone is greater
than the in the entire district; this indicates a disproportionate impact from BUGs.
As shown in Table 8-1, in all but two cases (African-Americans in the South
Coast, and Asian-Americans in Sacramento) the EJ Index was greater than one.
Block groups
Risk zones
BUGs
Methodology
By using GIS it is possible 
to calculate the area of a 
block group that is covered 
by a risk zone or a set of 
risk zones. We then use 
that percentage as a 
multiplier for the demo-
graphic data to infer envi-
ronmental justice impacts.
FIGURE 8-1
Illustration of risk zone methodology used in environmental justice
analysis
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EJ FACTORS
Race and ethnicity
For the four districts we surveyed, South Coast, San Joaquin, Sacramento, and
San Diego, we found that a slightly higher percentage of nonwhite residents live
within the risk zones than in the districts as a whole. The EJ Index ranges from
about 1.04 in Sacramento to 1.13 in San Diego. When the nonwhite category
was broken down into individual minority groups, the results were less consistent,
but an overall slight and consistent pattern remained. In some cases the discrep-
ancy is quite large. In the San Joaquin Valley for example, the EJ Index for Asian-
Americans is 1.46, meaning those living inside the risk zone are nearly twice as
likely to be Asian-American as those living outside of it. In Sacramento, the risk
zone population is almost a third more African-American than the rest of the dis-
trict, with an EJ Index of 1.27.
Age
In our risk zone demographic analysis, we found no disproportionate impact on
those under 18 years old. We did, however, consistently find a higher percentage
TABLE 8-1
Risk zone demographic analysis
Air district EJ variable Percent of population in z statistic EJ index
Risk zone Entire district
South Coast Nonwhite 62.9% 60.3% 5.50** 1.04
African-American 7.4% 7.4% –0.46 0.99
Asian-American 11.4% 11.0% 2.46** 1.04
Hispanic/Latino 43.8% 41.7% 5.10** 1.05
Over 65 12.3% 10.4% 8.34** 1.18
Household income < $25,000 3.8% 3.3% 6.87** 1.13
San Diego Nonwhite 50.2% 44.7% 5.77** 1.13
African-American 7.3% 6.0% 3.48** 1.21
Asian-American 11.4% 10.1% 3.46** 1.13
Hispanic/Latino 31.1% 28.1% 4.17** 1.11
Over 65 13.2% 11.8% 2.28* 1.12
Household income < $25,000 4.3% 3.6% 6.74** 1.20
Sacramento Nonwhite 41.3% 39.8% 1.92* 1.04
African-American 11.2% 8.8% 5.57** 1.27
Asian-American 10.3% 12.1% –2.34 0.86
Hispanic/Latino 18.8% 18.1% 1.21 1.04
Over 65 14.3% 11.4% 5.08** 1.26
Household Income < $25,000 4.6% 4.3% 0.18 1.06
San Joaquin Valley Nonwhite 56.3% 51.5% 3.62** 1.09
African-American 4.8% 4.1% 1.29 1.16
Asian-American 11.6% 8.4% 8.00** 1.37
Hispanic/Latino 56.3% 51.5% 0.38 1.09
Over 65 12.0% 10.0% 4.64** 1.20
Household Income < $25,000 6.7% 5.8% 5.32** 1.16
EJ Index   =     percent of EJ individuals in risk zone
percent of EJ individuals in entire district
* Significant at the 5% level
** Significant at the 1% level
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of elderly residents (65 and older) living inside the risk zone. With an EJ Index
ranging from 1.08 in San Diego to 1.21 in Sacramento, it is clear that the elderly
face a somewhat disproportionate amount of risk from BUGs in the four districts
we surveyed.
Income
In our risk zone demographic analysis we found that low-income populations,
households earning $25,000 or less, are more impacted by BUG emissions. From
Sacramento to San Diego, the EJ Index ranges from 1.08 to 1.22, showing a sig-
nificant disproportionate impact on low-income households inside the risk zone.
Proximity of schools to BUGS
To better analyze the impact on young children, the age category most vulner-
able to developing asthma or other respiratory ailments due to exposure to air
pollution, we looked at the proximity of primary and secondary schools to BUGs
in the four surveyed districts. Because the time children spend at school coin-
cides with the hours BUGs are likely to run, it is important to consider the impact
of BUG emissions on school-age children. More than 200 schools are located
within the boundaries of a BUG risk zone in the four districts we analyzed (see
Table 8-2). In the South Coast AQMD alone, 140 schools are located within
TABLE 8-2
School children’s exposure to BUG emissions, operation as permitted
Air district Schools within Risk Zone Estimated children enrolled
South Coast 140 96,600
San Diego 27 18,630
San Joaquin Valley Unified 34 23,460
Sacramento Metro 18 12,420
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Comparative demographics, population density, risk zone vs. air districts
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approximately 300 meters of a BUG, exposing children to high levels of harmful
diesel emissions that carry an increased risk of cancer and PM mortality. Based
upon this mapping exercise and the average enrollment of a California school,153
we estimate that over 150,000 school children may be exposed to unacceptably
high emissions from BUGs in just the four districts studied. Statewide figures
would be much higher.
BUGs are concentrated in densely populated areas
Using 2000 Census data, we compared the population density inside the risk zone
to the overall population density for the entire district. For each of the four dis-
tricts we surveyed, the population density in the risk zone was more than twice
that of the district as a whole. In the San Joaquin Valley, the risk zone was almost
25 times more densely populated than the district average. See Figure 8-2.
Cumulative exposures to PM
Emissions from BUGs can cause more significant risks when added to the already
high background concentration of diesel exhaust in the surrounding air. Using
methods similar to the demographic analysis, we looked at the background con-
centration of diesel PM emissions in census tracts in which a BUG is located and
compared that to the average for each district as a whole.154
We found that in each of the four districts we analyzed, census tracts with at
least one BUG have higher background concentrations of diesel PM emissions,
and therefore higher cancer risk levels, than the district as a whole. In the San
Diego AQMD, census tracts with BUGs had average cancer-risk levels from
diesel concentrations that were over 30 percent higher than the district average,
while in the San Joaquin Valley the risk level was 20 percent higher. Figure 8-3
shows the elevated cancer risk levels in census tracts with BUGs compared to the
districts as a whole.
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BUG hot spots are common in major California cities
Our risk zone analysis also demonstrates that many BUGs are located close
enough together that their risk zone circles overlap. Health risks may increase
considerably when individuals are exposed to emissions from more than one BUG.
Figure 8-4 shows that a large portion of downtown Sacramento is at risk from
exposure to multiple BUGs. We found many similar incidences of BUG hot spots
in downtowns and other areas throughout California. Figure 8-5 shows BUG
clusters in the San Diego area, inside and outside the downtown.
MULTIPLE BUGS AT SINGLE LOCATIONS
Many facilities in the CEC inventory have multiple BUGs at each location. One
commercial facility in Irvine has 15 BUGs. In our geostatistical analysis we were
unable to account for occasions when multiple BUGs are located at one facility
address. For this reason, the actual cancer and PM mortality risk may be many
times higher in locations with multiple BUGs.
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California’s recent electricity shortages highlighted the critical role BUGs play
during outages, but also illuminated regulatory gaps and potential abuses. The
California Air Resources Board (ARB) and many of the local air districts already
have taken several important steps to remedy these problems. Though the energy
crisis apparently is waning and a new budget crisis is looming, necessary reforms
should not be abandoned. This chapter summarizes Environmental Defense’s rec-
ommendations for air regulators and the legislature to reduce Californians’ expo-
sure to toxic emissions from diesel BUGs.
Adopt uniform permitting requirements for BUGs
All California air districts should require BUGs of 50 hp and larger to have per-
mits so that local air regulators will know how many BUGs are in their districts,
where they are located, and who owns them. This information will make it possi-
ble for the districts to enforce restrictions on BUG use. Collecting permit fees will
also provide the funding needed to finance enforcement efforts. When used as
permitted, BUGs provide valuable benefits to their owners: It’s only fair to ask
BUG owners to help pay for enforcement to prevent abuses. In fact, requiring
polluters to pay permitting fees that fund enforcement is a well-established regu-
latory principle of the federal Clean Air Act.
Ensure BUG use is confined to genuine emergencies
The local air districts also should ensure that BUG operation is confined to true emer-
gencies—those rare occasions when natural disasters or other events cause a loss of
grid power at the site where the BUG is located. Environmental Defense endorses the
ARB’s recommendation in its September 2001 Guidance for the Permitting of Elec-
trical Generation Technologies that the local air districts define a situation as an emer-
gency “when electrical or natural gas service fails or emergency pumping for fire
protection or flood relief is required.”155 Air districts that have not already done so
also should explicitly advise BUG owners that compensated curtailments—such
as participating in interruptible rate programs or responding to price signals from
real-time pricing or demand-bidding programs—do not justify BUG operation.
The California ISO, the California Power Authority, the CPUC, and the util-
ities can reinforce these regulations by ensuring that new load-shedding programs
do not counteract permit restrictions. All load-shedding programs should explic-
itly forbid operation of BUGs to meet curtailment calls or respond to price sig-
nals. Program operators also should require BUG owners to inform their local air
district of their participation in real-time pricing programs, interruptible tariffs or
other load-shedding programs.
Require pollution controls on new and existing BUGs 
The California Air Resources Board, as part of its comprehensive Diesel Risk
Reduction Program, has proposed tough new emissions standards for BUGs. The
CHAPTER 9
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draft regulations call for owners of in-use BUGs to reduce emissions of diesel PM
by 85% and comply with a 0.15 g/bhp-hr diesel PM emission rate, or replace the
engine with one that meets the requirements for new BUGs. New or rebuilt BUGs
greater than 50 bhp would be required to meet an emissions standard of at least
0.15 g/bhp-hr. In addition, the proposed standards would mandate low-sulfur
(CARB) diesel. The ARB expects to promulgate new regulations in early 2003,
with the standards becoming effective in 2004.
Environmental Defense supports prompt implementation of the proposed
guidelines with few exceptions. In particular, the oldest engines—for which no
retrofit technology is available to meet the new emissions standards—must not be
grandfathered. A strict timeline needs to be established for replacing or retiring
these BUGs.
Adopt effective enforcement measures 
Even if the ARB’s proposed emissions limits are implemented, effective enforce-
ment of restrictions on operating hours will be essential to guarantee that emis-
sions from BUGs remain at acceptable levels. Because BUGs are normally
expected to run only a few dozen hours per year, the ARB’s proposed standards
allow BUGs to emit fine particles at 15 times the rate allowed for prime engines,
which typically run hundreds of hours per year. The different emissions limits
make sense only if BUGs stay within their allotted annual operating hours.
The essential ingredients of effective enforcement include metering, record
keeping, inspections and penalties. Environmental Defense supports the ARB’s
recommendation that the air districts require non-resettable run-time meters on
all BUGs. Like the familiar, tamper-proof odometers found in cars, the run-time
meters provide basic data on the total hours of operation—the single most impor-
tant aspect of BUG use. In addition, BUG owners should be required to maintain
records tracking the number of hours of operation, the purpose of operation (i.e.
testing, maintenance, or emergency), and the nature of emergency hours. The air
districts should require this data to be reported once a year and should make it
available on request. A simple Internet-based system would allow centralized
reporting and record keeping of actual operating hours.
To ensure honest reporting, the air districts should conduct routine inspec-
tions of meters and run-time logs. Once emissions limits are implemented, inspec-
tors should verify that control equipment has been installed. At large facilities,
regular inspections should be expanded to include BUGs. The majority of BUGs,
however, are located at facilities that would not otherwise be inspected. Since
enforcement dollars are scarce, inspections at these facilities necessarily will be less
frequent. To provide an effective deterrent, a program of random inspections
should be instituted for these facilities, with severe penalties for violations.
Use financial incentives to reduce pollution from BUGs
When California emerges from its current budget crunch, the legislature should con-
sider providing direct financial incentives to retrofit or retire the dirtiest diesel BUGs.
A model for this is California’s Carl Moyer Program, which provides grants to cover
the cost of reducing NOx emissions from heavy-duty vehicles and equipment. In
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fact, the legislature allocated $14 million for air districts to mitigate the impacts
of increased BUG use during last year’s electricity shortages. This funding was
axed from the budget in the first round of cuts. It should be restored.
Encourage alternative backup power sources
Cleaner options for backup power exist or are being developed. Fuel cells are an
especially promising alternative. Because fuel cells are a relatively new technology,
operating experience must be gained to ensure they are an efficient and reliable
option. Facilities planning backup power upgrades, especially hospitals and other
large facilities with multiple power sources, should introduce fuel cells into their
backup mix to provide essential operating experience in these settings.
Protect the public’s right to know about risks from BUGs
The CEC’s BUG inventory paints only a partial picture. The ARB plans to expand
the inventory to include all BUGs, using permitting data from the air districts. In
addition to data on engine characteristics and type of use, Environmental Defense
recommends that the inventory include information on engine location, owner-
ship and retrofit status. The legislature should allocate sufficient funds to ensure
that the inventory will be comprehensive and that ARB can update it as new
BUGs are permitted and retrofits are completed. The inventory should be avail-
able in an easy to access form on ARB’s Web site so that Californians can find out
if there is a BUG near where they live, work, or go to school. In addition, the air
districts should collect and make available data on BUG run-times.
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Acute noncancer effects Any noncancer health effect that occurs over a relatively
short period of time, such as two weeks. The term is used to describe brief expo-
sures and effects which appear promptly after exposure.
Acute toxicity Involves harmful effects in an organism through a single or short-
term exposure.
Air basin A land area with generally similar meteorological and geographic con-
ditions throughout. To the extent possible, air basin boundaries are defined along
political boundary lines and include both the source and receptor areas. California
is divided into 15 air basins.
Air dispersion modeling A mathematical relationship between emissions and air
quality which simulates on a computer the transport, dispersion, and transforma-
tion of compounds emitted into the air.
Ambient concentrations The concentration of a substance or pollutant within
the immediate environs of an organism, related to the amount of possible exposure
in that location.
Background concentration In exposure assessment, the concentration of a sub-
stance in a defined control area during a fixed period of time before, during, or
after a data-gathering operation.
Bioassay A test to determine the relative strength of a substance by comparing
its effect on a test organism with that of a standard preparation.
California’s Proposition 65 The Safe Drinking and Toxic Enforcement Act of
1986. This Act, codified in California Health and Safety Code Section 25249.5,
et seq., states “No person in the course of doing business shall knowingly dis-
charge or release a chemical known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive
toxicity without first giving clear and reasonable warning to such individual.”
Carcinogen Any substance that can cause or aggravate cancer.
Chronic health effects An adverse effect on a human or animal in which symp-
toms recur frequently or develop slowly over a long period of time.
Chronic noncancer effects Any noncancer health effect that occurs over a rela-
tively long period of time (e.g., months or years).
Chronic toxicity The ability of a substance or mixture of substances to cause
harmful effects over an extended period, usually from repeated or continuous
exposure, sometimes lasting for the entire life of the exposed organism.
Cogenerator unit The consecutive generation of useful thermal and electric
energy from the same fuel source, in the same machine.
Criteria air pollutants As required by law, EPA has identified and set standards
for six pollutants: ozone, carbon monoxide, total suspended particulates, sulfur
dioxide, lead, and nitrogen oxide. These are known as “criteria” pollutants because
Glossary of technical terms
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EPA is required to set or revise these standards based on the criteria of their
potential health and welfare effects.
Cumulative exposures The sum of exposures of an organism to a pollutant over
a period of time.
De minimus level A risk level that is small enough to be considered insignificant
Demand-response program A program, usually voluntary, in which participants
are offered a financial incentive to reduce energy consumption during a period of
tight supply or high spot prices.
Distributed generation A distributed generation system involves small amounts
of generation located on a utility’s distribution system for the purpose of meeting
local (substation level) peak loads and/or displacing the need to build additional
(or upgrade) local distribution lines.
Dynamic pricing A real-time adjustment of prices based on supply, demand, and
competitor’s price fluctuations. A type of demand-response or load-shedding program.
Environmental justice The pursuit of equal justice and equal protection for all peo-
ple under the environmental statutes and regulations. Environmental impacts do
not fall equally on everyone in society. Studies have shown that chemical manu-
facturing plants, hazardous waste landfills, highways and other developments with
negative environmental consequences are more likely to be located in low-income
and minority communities. Low-income populations and minority populations
are more likely to be exposed to physical displacement and adverse impacts on
their cultural institutions, traditional forms of land use, community cultural char-
acter, religious practices, and financial well being. The idea behind environmental
justice is to recognize these disproportionate impacts and try to avoid them.
Fine particles Particulate matter less than 2.5 microns in diameter, also referred
to as PM2.5.
Gensets Diesel or gas-fired engines used for the purpose of generating electricity.
Horsepower A unit of power in the U.S. Customary System, equal to 745.7 watts
or 33,000 foot-pounds per minute, often a standard measure of engine size.
Intake fraction The fraction of emissions from a source that is breathed by an
exposed population. It is calculated as the ratio of the total intake, summed over
all people, divided by the total emissions.
Interruptible contracts Electrical supply contracts that allow the supplier to cur-
tail or stop service at times.
Load-shedding Reduction of peak demand through voluntary curtailment of
electrical loads, often accomplished by simply turning off equipment.
Median aerodynamic diameter The average diameter of a particle of matter of a
given type (e.g., diesel particulate matter), used for modeling and other purposes.
Meta-analyses The process or technique of synthesizing research results by using
various statistical methods to retrieve, select, and combine results from previous
separate but related studies.
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Metabolize Processing of a specific substance by the living body. In the context of
air pollution, this indicates a movement of particles out of the body or into fatty
tissue.
Mobile sources Sources of air pollution such as automobiles, motorcycles, trucks,
off-road vehicles, boats, and airplanes.
Mortality risk The expected likelihood of death from a particular exposure or
series of exposures.
Mutagen An agent that causes a permanent genetic change in a cell other than
that which occurs during normal growth.
Mutagenic potency The capacity of a chemical or physical agent to cause perma-
nent genetic changes.
New Source Review The permittering process for new and modified stationary
sources, mandated by the federal Clean Air Act.
Nitrogen oxide or NOx, is the generic term for a group of highly reactive gases,
all of which contain nitrogen and oxygen in varying amounts. They form when
fuel is burned at high temperatures, as in a combustion process. The primary
sources of NOx are motor vehicles, electric utilities, and other industrial, com-
mercial, and residential sources that burn fuels.
Occupational exposure Exposure to compound or class of compounds through
routine work performance. Of special concern due to the repeated, prolonged
contact.
Off-road engines Any non-stationary device, powered by an internal combustion
engine or motor, used primarily off the highways to propel, move, or draw persons
or property, and used in the following applications: marine vessels, construc-
tion/farm equipment, locomotives, utility and lawn and garden equipment, and
off-road motorcycles..
Particulate matter (PM2.5,PM10) A criteria air pollutant, particulate matter
includes dust, soot and other tiny bits of solid materials that are released into and
move around in the air. Particulates are produced by many activities, including
burning of diesel fuels by trucks and buses, incineration of garbage, mixing and
application of fertilizers and pesticides, road construction, industrial processes
such as steel making, mining operations, agricultural burning (field and slash
burning), and operation of fireplaces and woodstoves. Particulate pollution can
cause eye, nose and throat irritation and other health problems. The number after
PM refers to the diameter of the particles in microns.
Peaking capacity The maximum electrical output of a given facility.
Peaker Plant An electric generating unit used mainly or exclusively during peri-
ods of peak electrical demand.
Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs) Organic compounds that contain car-
bon and hydrogen with a fused ring structure containing at least two benzene (six-
sided) rings. PAHs may also contain additional fused rings that are not six-sided. The
combustion of organic substances is a common source of atmospheric PAHs.
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Portable generators An internal combustion engine which is designed and capa-
ble of being carried or moved from one location to another and does not remain
at a single location for more than 12 consecutive months.
Prime engines Engines that are permitted to run on a regular basis, usually for
hundreds or thousands of hours per year.
Real-time pricing The instantaneous pricing of electricity based on the cost of the
electricity available for use at the time the electricity is demanded by the customer.
Receptor grid The division of a sampling location into defined, symmetric areas
for the purpose of measuring the air pollution at the location.
Reference Exposure Concentration (RfC) An estimate derived by the U.S. EPA
of a daily exposure to the human population (including sensitive subgroups) that
is likely to be without appreciable risk of deleterious effects during a lifetime of
exposure. The RfC is derived from a no- or lowest-observed adverse effect level
from human or animal exposures, to which uncertainty or “safety” factors are
applied.
Reference Exposure Level A health risk value measure developed by the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health to gauge exposure in the
workplace; based on a time-weighted average for up to a ten-hour workday dur-
ing a 40-hour work week.
Residual risk The quantity of health risk remaining after emissions controls are
applied.
Retrofit Addition of a pollution control device without making major changes to
the generating plant. Also called backfit.
Risk assessment The characterization of the potential adverse health effects of
human exposures to environmental hazards.
Rolling blackouts A controlled and temporary interruption of electrical service.
These are necessary when a utility is unable to meet heavy peak demands because
of an extreme deficiency in power supply.
Run-time The number of hours an engine operates during the course of one year.
Self-generation A generation facility dedicated to serving a particular retail cus-
tomer, usually located on the customer’s premises. The facility may either be
owned directly by the retail customer or owned by a third party with a contractual
arrangement to provide electricity to meet some or all of the customer’s load.
Small-scale generation Electric power generation systems from 1-kilowatt to
5-megawatt in capacity, such as fuel cells, engine/generator sets, advanced com-
bustion turbines, and microturbines.
Stack parameters Limits on chimney, smokestack, or vertical pipe discharges of
used air.
Stage 1 Alert Declared by the California independent systems operators when it
is clear that an operating reserve shortfall is unavoidable or the operating reserve
is forecast in real-time to be less than the minimum after using available resources.
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Stage 2 Alert Declared by the California independent system operators when it
is clear that an operating reserve shortfall (less than 5%) is unavoidable or the
operating reserve is forecast in real-time to be less than 5 percent after dispatch-
ing all available resources.
Stage 3 Alert Declared by the California independent system operators when it
is clear that an operating reserve shortfall (less than 1.5%) is unavoidable or the
operating reserve is forecast in real-time to be less than 1.5 percent after dis-
patching all available resources.
Stationary source A place or object from which pollutants are released that does
not move. Stationary sources include power plants, gas stations, incinerators,
houses, etc.
Toxic air contaminant An air pollutant, identified in regulations by the ARB,
which may cause or contribute to an increase in deaths or in serious illness, or
which may pose a present or potential hazard to human health. TACs are consid-
ered under a different regulatory process (California Health and Safety Code Sec-
tion 39650 et seq.) than pollutants subject to CAAQS. Health effects from TACs
may occur at extremely low levels, and it is typically difficult to identify levels of
exposure that do not produce adverse health effects.
Toxicity factor The degree to which a substance or mixture of substances can
harm humans or animals.
Uninterrupted power supply A battery with sophisticated electronic control cir-
cuitry which switches to battery power when the main power fails so that there is
no break in the electricity provided to equipment.
Sources:
EPA environmental glossary: http://www.epa.gov/OCEPAterms/intro.htm
CEC energy glossary: http://www.energy.ca.gov/glossary/index.html
Electric Power Industry glossary:
http://www.energycentral.com/sections/directories/glossary/
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ACGIH American Council of Government Industrial Hygienists
APCD Air Pollution Control District
AQMD Air Quality Management District
ATCM Airborne Toxic Control Measures
ATSDR Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
BACT Best Available Control Technology
BUG Backup Generator
CAA Clean Air Act
CAPCOA California Air Pollution Control Officers’ Association
CARB California Air Resources Board
CO Carbon monoxide
CEC California Energy Commission
DG Distributed Generation
DRRP Diesel Risk Reduction Plan
DPM Diesel Particulate Matter
EF Emission Factor
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
GIS Geographic Information Systems
HEI Health Effects Institute
HI Hazard Index
IARC International Agency for Research on Cancer
IC Internal Combustion
iF Intake Fraction
ISC Industrial Source Complex
kW Kilowatt
MEI Maximally Exposed Individual
MRL Maximum Risk Level
MW Megawatt
NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NOx Nitrogen Oxides
OEHHA Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment
OSHPAD Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development
PAHs Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons
PM Particulate Matter
US DHHS/NTP United States Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices/National Toxicology Program
USGS United States Geological Survey
VOCs Volatile Organic Compounds
WHO (IPCS) World Health Organization (International Programme on
Chemical Safety)
Abbreviations
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The BUG database was derived from the CEC BUG inventory. Facility addresses
were geocoded using the Geographic Data Technology (GDT) Streetmap 2000
database extension and Arcview 3.2 software. Address information was available
for the majority of BUGs in the inventory, except in the Bay Area AQMD PG&E
data. Those BUGs with inaccurate, incomplete or missing facility addresses were
not included in the GIS analysis.
In the geocoding process, complete street addresses were individually matched
to latitude and longitude coordinates by the Streetmap program, which plots dis-
tances along a street line segment based on the address number. Each segment of
each street line contains a code for the address number. Since all streets in the
United States are standardized to have even addresses on one side and odd
addresses on the other, the geocoder can plot points on the correct side of the
street. This system is extremely accurate, especially in urban and suburban areas
Dropping all BUGs without address data or those that did not match with street
segment coordinates ensures the highest possible accuracy.
Of the 3,342 BUGs in the CEC database for which an address was available,
3,328 were successfully geocoded. An additional 451 BUGs without address infor-
mation were excluded. We projected the resulting data set onto the state of Cali-
fornia’s official projection system: Albers Equal Area Conic along with all other
data sets to facilitate overlay analysis.
GIS data sets and sources
BUG risk zones were derived from a general buffer program and shifted down-
wind from the location of each BUG. Following the detailed analysis of the wind
patterns in each air basin, we derived a buffer radius congruent with the limit of
the one in 1 million added cancer risk of the generators. These buffers were shifted
a modeled distance downwind from each generator according to the prevailing
winds of the air basin.
All demographic layers, including race, income, age, and population density
were taken from 2000 U.S. census data. We used both the block group and tract
levels of geography for overlay analysis with the risk zones. The block group data
was the most appropriate level of geography and was used in most analyses.
Data layers of schools and parks were provided by Environmental Systems
Research Institute (ESRI) but were originally derived from the Geographic
Names Information System, a federal government resource.
For land-use data we used the National Land Cover Database, a product of
the USGS based on satellite imagery.
Worker density data for Los Angeles was provided by the South Coast Area
Governments (SCAG) Regional Transportation Plan. This data was only avail-
able for Los Angeles County by census tract for 1997.
Data on background exposures to diesel particulate matter were taken from
the Environmental Defense Scorecard website (www.scorecard.org). The source
for the Scorecard data is the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s National-
Scale Air Toxics Assessment.
APPENDIX A
GIS methodology and data sources
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For toxic air contaminants emitted from diesel BUGs, the health risk can be esti-
mated as the product of three elements: (1) the quantity of contaminant released;
(2) the increase in exposure concentration per unit release; and (3) the risk of
adverse effect per unit increase in exposure concentration. The first element is
determined by multiplying an emission factor by the amount of engine use. The
emission factor indicates the amount of pollutant emitted per unit of engine use.
Air dispersion models are used to evaluate the second element, based on informa-
tion about emission characteristics and meteorology. The third element is
addressed by toxicity values, which account for acute, chronic cancer, and chronic
noncancer effects, respectively.
The three elements summarize a more general framework, presented in Fig-
ure B-1, for evaluating risk from environmental sources.
Emission factors
Emission factors (EFs) indicate the mass of emissions that will occur per amount
of BUG activity. Emission factors for the evaluations presented here were taken
from the EPA’s compilation of EFs, known as AP-42156. For diesel engines (such
as BUGs) the EFs are expressed in terms of grams of pollutant emitted per horse-
power-hour of electrical power generated by the engine. EFs for particulate mat-
ter with a mean diameter of 10 micrometers or less (PM10), in pounds per million
BTU, are listed in AP-42 as 0.31 and 0.1, for small (<600 hp) and large (>600 hp)
engines, respectively. Essentially all of the diesel particulate emissions are expected
to be smaller than 2.5 micrometers in diameter. Thus, for this investigation the
following terms may be considered to be synonymous: diesel particulate matter
(DPM), diesel PM10, and diesel PM2.5.
Air dispersion modeling
To explore the health impacts of increased BUG operation on nearby populations
Environmental Defense commissioned an analysis of predicted increases in ambient
concentration of diesel pollutants owing to atmospheric emissions from individual
diesel BUGs. Air Resource Specialists (ARS) conducted air dispersion modeling of
generic BUGs using weather data from five California cities. ARS used a standard
air dispersion model, Industrial Source Complex (ISC)157. ISC is a regulatory-
approved model used to determine the impact of emissions on the surrounding
community, for purposes such as permitting new sources. Using local weather data
and information on how an engine is situated in relation to surrounding build-
ings, ISC models the ground-level concentration at a grid of discrete receptor
APPENDIX B
Risk assessment methods
Emissions
source
Ambient
concentration
Personal
exposure Dose Health risk
FIGURE B-1
General framework for evaluating environmental health risks
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points in the vicinity of the source. Wind speed and atmospheric stability are key
determinants of how the plume of emissions from a source is dispersed. Wind
speed determines how rapidly clean air dilutes the emissions. Atmospheric stabil-
ity determines the rate of vertical mixing in the atmosphere. Unstable conditions
lead to more rapid vertical mixing. This spreading or mixing dilutes the emissions,
thereby decreasing the concentration while spreading it over a larger volume. ARS
conducted air dispersion modeling using hourly meteorological data for San
Diego, San Francisco, Fresno, Los Angeles, and Sacramento. Five years of histor-
ical meteorological data were used for each city. Because a generic BUG was mod-
eled, researchers assumed it would run only a small proportion of hours each year,
without knowing when those hours would occur. Different operating scenarios for
BUGs would result in different seasonal and daily patterns of BUG operation. To
support analysis of a plausible range of potential operating scenarios for BUGs,
ARS conducted three separate modeling runs for each BUG:
• In the “All” scenario, which BUGs can operate at any time and any day of
the year, and BUG use is randomly allocated to a fixed number of operating
hours, selected from among 24 hours per day and 365 days per year (8,760
possible hours).
• In the “Business” scenario, BUGs operate only between 7 am and 7 pm, and
BUG use is randomly allocated to a fixed number of operating hours, selected
from among 12 hours per day and 365 days per year (4,380 possible hours).
• In the “Summer” scenario, BUGs only operate between noon and 6 pm during
the months of June, July, August, and September, and BUG use is randomly
allocated to six hours per day, 122 days per year (732 possible hours).
Results generated by these modeling scenarios were combined with assumptions
about annual run-time to develop results by operating scenarios. ISC model results
are expressed in terms of the highest one-hour concentration, the highest 24-hour
concentration, and the annual average (for a specified number of operating hours
and season/time of operation)158.
Toxicity
The toxicity of a chemical indicates the risk of an adverse health outcome occur-
ring because of exposure to that chemical. The three health risks that are typically
considered in a health-risk assessment for toxic air contaminants and that have
associated toxicity values are acute, chronic cancer, and chronic noncancer risks. In
addition, we have estimated direct mortality effects due to PM2.5 using recent
epidemiological evidence.
Based on our analysis, we conclude that the direct mortality risk poses the
single largest concern for the health effects of diesel BUG emissions. Of the three
health risks typically considered in a risk assessment (acute, chronic cancer, and
chronic noncancer), chronic cancer risk is the largest public health concern.
Toxicity values for selected pollutants for acute, chronic cancer, and chronic non-
cancer risks are listed in Table B-1. These values have been peer-reviewed and ap-
proved by regulatory agencies. They are designed protect public health, meaning that
they should include a margin of safety to protect children, the elderly, and the infirm.
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The toxicity value for direct mortality risk is taken from peer-reviewed litera-
ture for populationwide exposure, based on an article by the Chairman and the
Chief Deputy Executive Officer of the California Air Resources Board.
Acute toxicity
Acute health risks are those that result from short-term exposure, typically defined
as less than 14 days, whereas chronic health risks are associated with long-term
exposures, typically defined as longer than three months. The toxicity for acute and
chronic noncancer is expressed in terms of a threshold concentration that should not
be exceeded during a specified exposure period. The acute and chronic noncancer
risk is often presented as a Hazard Index (HI), which is the actual concentration
divided by the threshold concentration. For example, an HI of two indicates that
the estimated exposure concentration is twice the threshold concentration.
The acceptable threshold concentrations for acute toxicity are given by the
Reference Exposure Level159 (REL) values maintained by the Office of Environ-
mental Health and Hazard Assessment. To understand the significance of the
one-hour maximum concentration results predicted for BUGs, they are presented
as a fraction of the respective REL. This comparison provides a partial basis for
assessing which chemicals pose the greatest acute hazards. Among those chemi-
cals for which both emission factors and REL values are available, the chemical
with the most stringent acute concentration limit for BUGs is acrolein. We deter-
mined this by comparing all chemicals for which we have an emission factor and
an REL, and choosing the one with the highest EF/REL ratio.
Chronic cancer and noncancer risks
Toxicity for chronic cancer risk is typically expressed in terms of the lifetime risk
of excess cancer cases per unit concentration. This value is multiplied by the con-
TABLE B-1
Health risk values*
Chemical Chronic Acute
Reference Exposure Level Reference Exposure Level
(REL) (REL)
Acrolein 0.06 0.19
Formaldehyde 3 94
Propylene 3000 NA
Total PAHs NA NA
Benzene 60 1300
Acetaldehyde 9 NA
Butadiene 20 NA
Toluene 300 37,000
Xylenes 700 22,000
PM-10 NA NA
Diesel exhaust 5 NA
Naphthalene 9 NA
*in micrograms per cubic meter
Source: Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA), May 2000.
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centration to obtain the incremental cancer risk. For example, if the average con-
centration increase of a certain chemical is 2 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3),
and the toxicity is 3 per million per µg/m3, then the risk from that source is esti-
mated to be 6 per million. This is interpreted to mean that if one million people
were exposed to the given concentration for the duration of a 70-year lifetime, we
would expect six people to contract cancer because of their exposure to this chem-
ical from this source.
To determine whether a risk is large or small, one compares the estimated risk
to respective benchmarks. One benchmark for comparison is a risk level that is
small enough to be considered insignificant, or de minimus. The California Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (CalEPA) defines de minimus to be one per million
or less for chronic cancer risks, and an HI of 0.2 or less for acute and chronic non-
cancer risks. The benchmark for chronic cancer risk is based on the 1990 Clean
Air Act, which allows sources to be exempt from regulation and residual risk to be
considered negligible when posing less than a one in a million risk to the most
exposed individual. CalEPA considers an HI greater than 10 to be sufficient
grounds for denial of an emissions permit for regulated emission sources. A
chronic cancer risk greater than 10 times the de minimus level, or 10 per million,
is large enough to warrant risk reduction actions. A risk greater than 100 times
the de minimus level, or 100 per million, may be grounds for denying a permit.
Based on a comparison of published values for chronic cancer and chronic
noncancer toxicity, the most stringent constraint appears to be the cancer risk for
diesel exhaust. The cancer risk potency of diesel exhaust, according to CalEPA, is
300 per million per µg/m3. This means that chronic exposure to one µg/m3 would
yield a lifetime excess cancer risk of 300 per million, i.e. 300 times the de minimus
risk level. The incremental increase in chronic exposure concentration must be
less than 0.0033 µg/m3 to be below the de minimus risk level.
Mortality risk
Because most PM emissions from diesel engines are smaller than 1 (m in diameter,
it is appropriate to consider all DPM as PM2.5. Recent evidence—summarized
by Lloyd and Cackette (2001)160—concludes that the largest public health con-
cern for PM2.5 is the mortality risk. Furthermore, current research161 indicates
that the risks from PM2.5 may be even greater than previously thought.
Lloyd and Cackette (2001) base their estimates of the toxicity of DPM on
studies investigating the link between ambient PM and population mortality. Given
the size and chemical composition of DPM, we would expect DPM to be more toxic
than ambient PM2.5. Thus, while the studies that Lloyd and Cackette cite represent
the best available evidence of DPM toxicity, the values they use are based on studies
of ambient PM2.5, and may therefore underestimate the true toxicity of DPM.
Lloyd and Cackette provide four estimates of the short-term mortality and
two estimates of the long-term (one-year) mortality attributable to direct (pri-
mary) DPM concentrations162 of 1.8 µg/m3. Each estimate is presented in terms
of the mean, 5th percentile, and 95th percentile value, with mean values for short-
term effects from 665 to 2,531 deaths/year, and mean values for combined short-
and long-term effects163 of 2,880 and 3,566 deaths/year. Because BUGs are
installed to operate intermittently over periods of many years, it is appropriate to
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consider the combined short- and long-term effects of DPM exposure. We used the
higher of the two mean values from Lloyd and Cackette (3,566 deaths/year)164 for
estimating direct mortality effects. Even this value may underestimate the toxicity
of DPM, because these toxicity values are for ambient PM2.5 rather than DPM.
PM2.5 may be even more toxic than was thought at the time that Lloyd and
Cackette completed their review article, and recent research165 indicates a PM2.5
toxicity value approximately twice the value in Lloyd and Cackette (2001). Never-
theless, we have used the results from Lloyd and Cackette because they are more
comprehensive and compare several studies.
Based on the estimated health outcome of 3,566 deaths/year in California
owing to average ambient levels of 1.8 µg/m3 of direct DPM, and a state popula-
tion of 33 million, we estimate a toxicity of 60 deaths per million per ug/m3.166
Note that this risk is in addition to the other effects calculated elsewhere in this
report (e.g., the chronic cancer risk).
An important difference between the mortality risk and the chronic cancer
risk is that the former is calculated based on a one-year exposure scenario, while
the latter is calculated based on a 70-year exposure scenario. While the PM2.5
risk value of 60 per million per µg/m3 appears to be five times lower than the
DPM chronic cancer toxicity (300 per million per µg/m3), the former occurs after
only one-seventieth of the exposure, and thus after only one-seventieth of the
intake. Therefore the direct mortality risk is estimated to be 14 times higher than the
chronic cancer risk.
Unlike the REL toxicity values, which are designed to be protective of sensi-
tive populations, the toxicity values used in Lloyd and Cackette (2001) represent
the risk to the general public. The risks to sensitive populations will be even
greater than is presented in this report. For diesel PM, we expect the list of sensi-
tive populations to include young people, the elderly, and the infirm.
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The first step in the analysis was to derive an estimate of the intake fraction for
DPM emitted by BUGs. An estimated intake fraction of 15 grams inhaled per
tonne of DPM emitted was derived from published data on the concentration and
emissions of DPM in major California air basins. We start by converting the units
used to express the toxicity of DPM. CalEPA uses a concentration-based toxicity
of 0.000300 per µg/m3 167, meaning that if a person were exposed to 1 µg/m3 of
DPM for their entire 70-year lifetime, we would predict an excess cancer risk of
300 per million. This is converted to an intake-based toxicity of 0.00078 per mil-
lion per gram of intake, meaning that if a person inhales 1 gram of DPM over the
course of their entire 70-year lifetime, we would predict an excess cancer risk of
780 per million. Conversely, a population intake of 1.0 kg will be expected to lead
to one cancer case. Similarly, a population intake of 0.07 kg per year is estimated
to cause one excess death per year owing to the direct mortality effect of PM.
The final step in this calculation is to determine the total emissions from all
BUGs. This calculation, which is presented in Table C-1, assumes that there are a
total of approximately 11,000 BUGs in California168 operating an average of 100
hours per year.169 Consequently, the total run-time of BUGs is 1,100,000 hours.
Using emission factors170 of 0.0022 pounds (1 gram) of PM per horsepower-hour
for smaller BUGs (ranging from 100 to 600 hp) and 0.0007 lb/hp-hr (0.32 grams)
for larger BUGs (601 to 2100 hp), these 1.1 million hours of operation cause a
total of 380 million grams (380 metric tonnes) of DPM emissions.171
• The data points are Emissions, 380 tonnes of PM emitted each year;
• Intake fraction, 0.015 kg inhaled per tonne emitted;
• Toxicity, one cancer case per 1.0 kg of DPM inhaled, and one death per
0.073 kg of PM inhaled.
The numbers are combined to yield a prediction of approximately five excess can-
cer cases per year and approximately 70 excess deaths per year due to BUG PM
emissions.
In this intake fraction calculation, mortality is directly (i.e. linearly) propor-
tional to average annual operating hours. To calculate mortality effects for differ-
ent assumptions about operating hours, as presented in Table 7-3 and Figure 7-6,
we simply scaled the above estimates. For example, increasing the number of
annual operating hours from 100 to 200 doubles the expected number of deaths
from both cancer and direct PM mortality.
APPENDIX C
Intake fraction analysis approach
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